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Abstract 
Price setting in German metal-working industries is analysed using a monthly panel of 
individual price data for more than 2,000 plants covering the period from 1980 to 2001. 
Motivated by several models in the literature, a duration model is estimated. Price 
changes can be explained by a combination of state-dependence and time-dependence. 
Time-dependence clearly dominates and is strongest if a price increase follows a price 
increase. This occurs most likely after 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, … quarters. This time-dependent 
effect is so strong and cost and price increases are so weak in the observed period that 
adjustment occurs before the sticky price sufficiently deviates from the flexible price, as 
traditional menu cost models assume. State-dependence seems to be most relevant in 
periods with decreasing demand. Then firms reduce prices and the time between two 
price cuts only rarely exceeds four months. 
Keywords:  price rigidity, duration analysis, business survey data  
JEL-Classification:  D43, E31, L11  
Non-Technical Summary 
The last 20 years have seen a lively debate on whether firms decide to change a price in 
response to a change in economic conditions (state-dependent price setting) or whether 
this point of time is given exogenously (time-dependent price setting). Many 
macroeconomic models of price setting assume time-dependent price setting.  
This paper analysis this question based on qualitative, firm-specific survey data for 
producer prices in the western German metal-working industry using a duration model. 
It shows for the period from January 1980 until November 2001 that firms follow 
mostly a time-dependent price setting rule under “normal” conditions, when price 
increases follow price increases, albeit with some time-lag. However, the point of time 
of a price change seems to depend on the state of the economic environment, if prices 
are reduced or a price increase follows a price reduction. Prices are reduced if demand 
has decreased since the preceding price change or demand decreases are expected. If 
competitors reduce their prices and the firm’s last price change has already been a 
reduction it cuts its price further, probably for fear of losing market share. The timing of 
a price reduction is not affected by cost changes. Cost reductions do not decrease prices 
but temporarily increase profits. 
There is only little evidence in favour of menu cost models that assume that if firms 
face a fixed cost of price adjustment continuously increasing costs or demand lead to a 
postponement of price changes. This may be the case because during the periods 
observed cost increases were relatively small. 
The question of time-dependent price setting versus state-dependent price setting is, of 
course, only part of the price-setting process since it does not tell us anything about the 
size of a price change. However, if time-dependence cannot be rejected it greatly 
facilitates modelling the price-setting process and understanding its implications at the 
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Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Während der letzten 20 Jahre fand eine lebhafte Debatte darüber statt, ob Firmen den 
Zeitpunkt einer Preisänderung von den wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten abhängig 
machen (Zustandsabhängigkeit) oder ob er davon unabhängig erfolgt 
(Zeitabhängigkeit). Viele makroökonomische Modelle des Preissetzungsverhalten 
unterstellen Zeitabhängigkeit. 
In diesem Papier wird diese Frage anhand von  qualitativen, firmenspezifischen 
Umfragedaten für die Produzentenpreise in der westdeutschen Metallindustrie 
beantwortet. Dabei wird ein Verweildauermodell verwendet. Es zeigt für einen 
Zeitraum von Januar 1980 bis November 2001, dass Firmen innerhalb eines "normalen" 
ökonomischen Umfelds, bei dem Preisanhebungen auf Preisanhebungen folgen, 
überwiegend eine zeitabhängige Regel befolgen. Dagegen scheint der Zeitpunkt der 
Preisänderung dann vom Zustand im Umfeld der Unternehmung abhängig zu sein, 
wenn Preise gesenkt werden oder eine Preiserhöhung auf eine Preissenkung folgt. 
Preise werden anlässlich eines tatsächlichen oder erwarteten Nachfragerückgangs 
gesenkt. Senken Wettbewerber ihre Preise und war die letzte Preisänderung eines 
Unternehmens eine Preissenkung, dann senkt das Unternehmen seine Preise weiter, 
möglicherweise aus Sorge um Marktanteile. Der Zeitpunkt eines Preisrückgangs wird 
nicht durch Änderungen in den Kosten beeinflusst. Sie führen nicht zu (unmittelbaren) 
Preisrückgängen, sondern zu einem (vorübergehenden) Anstieg der Gewinne. 
Das Papier findet wenig Evidenz für Menükostenmodelle, wonach kontinuierliche 
Steigerungen bei den Kosten oder der Nachfrage bei fixen Preisanpassungskosten zu 
einer Verzögerung von Preisänderungen führen. Möglicherweise liegt das daran, dass 
im Untersuchungszeitraum die Kostensteigerungen vergleichsweise gering waren.  
Die Frage, ob Preise zeitabhängig oder zustandsabhängig geändert werden, ist natürlich 
nur ein Teil des Preissetzungsprozesses, denn es sagt noch nichts über das Ausmaß der 
Preisänderung aus. Jedoch wird die Modellierung des Preissetzungsprozesses und das 
Verständnis seiner Auswirkungen auf aggregiertem Niveau wesentlich vereinfacht, 
wenn die Annahme der Zeitabhängigkeit nicht verworfen werden kann. 
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005 
1 Introduction 
There seems to be general agreement that, from a theoretical point of view, state-
dependent models of price adjustment are more appealing than purely time-dependent 
models. The latter are, however, much more tractable than state-dependent models. In 
particular, the analysis of the effect of monetary shocks on aggregate output and prices 
is rather intricate in state-dependent models and leads to inconclusive results, as is 
shown by the theoretical analyses of Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel 
(1991) and Caplin and Leahy (1991).  
Time-dependent models postulate that the timing of a price change is exogenous 
to the firm and that it only decides on the size of the adjustment. In state-dependent 
models not only the amount of the price change but also the timing is the outcome of an 
intertemporal optimisation by the firm. Well known time-dependent models have been 
introduced by Taylor (1980) and by Calvo (1983). Taylor-contracts have a deterministic 
length. It is assumed that prices are changed only at the beginning of the contract and 
not revised during the contract. Calvo-contracts are random contracts. Firms are only 
allowed to change their price if they receive a signal. This signal occurs with constant 
probability. The “invisible hand” tosses a coin for every firm until “head” occurs. Then 
the price is reset and the tossing starts anew. The statistical model underlying a 
prominent state-dependent model, the menu-cost model, goes one step further by 
observing gains and losses, the “gambler’s wealth”. The gambler gains one unit of 
money each time “head” occurs and he loses one unit of money each time “tail” occurs. 
The gambler decides each period whether he stops the game, i.e. whether he increases 
or reduces his price, if his “wealth” or his debt reaches a certain, not necessarily 
symmetric threshold. Then the game starts anew.  
Attempts to quantify the importance of state-dependent pricing empirically have 
begun only recently. Using a variance decomposition, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004)  
claim to show for US consumer prices that 95 percent of the total variance of monthly 
inflation can be attributed to variations in the size of price changes and only 5 percent to 








Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005
Golosov and Lucas (2003) investigate the relation of changes in the rate of 
inflation to real output and inflation. They develop a state-dependent model in which 
individual firms are subject to general inflation and large idiosyncratic shocks. The 
latter makes their model flexible enough to match historical data from high and low-
inflation countries. High inflation is sufficient to warrant frequent price adjustments. If 
inflation is low, prices are changed nonetheless because the idiosyncratic shocks add to 
the inflation and small changes in the re-pricing probability already cause large changes 
in inflation in their model. Real aggregate effects of monetary instability are relatively 
small.  
The empirical work of Golosov and Lucas is based on a subset of the Klenow and 
Kryvstov data. It contains data on prices only. Shocks are therefore identified indirectly 
by large price changes. The present study instead analyses a dataset that includes 
information not only on price changes but on explanatory variables as well. Common 
and idiosyncratic shocks can be distinguished. The data source is the monthly business 
cycle survey for manufacturing from the German business research institution, the ifo 
Institute. The data entail information on producer prices and cover the years 1980 to 
2001. The data end in November 2001 because of confidentiality restrictions and a 
change in the questionnaire.  
The criticism has often been made that producer prices are essentially list prices. 
Sales prices are different from contract to contract even for the same product and most 
contracts include non-price elements like delivery lags. Yet, most theories of price 
setting are much more suited to producer prices than to consumer prices. In addition, if 
consumer prices are set according to a simple pricing strategy like a fixed mark-up on 
marginal unit costs, then it is the production sector that determines the inflation 
dynamics. 
This study takes account of the heterogeneity of business conditions and price 
setting by focusing on a subset of industries that are more homogenous and change 
prices not too frequently compared with changes in the level of production. This subset 
consists of manufacturers of machinery, electrical machinery, precision instruments and 
motor vehicles. By type of goods, it covers basic goods, capital goods and durable 
consumer goods. In 1995 its share of GDP was 13 per cent and its share of the PPI  
25  per cent. Common to these “metal-working industries”, as they are called in 
Germany, is a more or less unique collective wage contract for western Germany that 
leads to synchronised wage increases.  
Descriptive statistics show that in these industries price increases exhibit a strong 
seasonal pattern, whereas price decreases follow a different pattern. Furthermore, prices 
are often increased 12 months after the preceding price change but this matters only if 
the preceding price change was already an increase. This points to time-dependent price 
setting in the case of a stable economic environment and to a switch to state-dependent 
price setting if the environment becomes unstable. On the other hand, since wage 
contracts often have a duration of 12 (or 24) months, it is very natural to presume that 
wage contracts are the reason behind the regular price setting. Yet, the labour cost share 
in these industries is comparatively small, falling from 35 percent on average in 1980 to 
32 percent in 1995. Rising prices at times of collectively bargained wage increases may 
antagonise customers less.  
The analysis is restricted to western Germany, mainly for practical reasons. In the 
early 1990s there were a lot of drop-outs in the east German data so that the longer 
spells are probably selective. Ignoring eastern German data, on the other hand, should 
not be selective since its share in total German manufacturing is small. The wage 
bargaining process does not apply to eastern Germany, and including eastern Germany 
might increase unobserved heterogeneity due to restructuring after unification that 
creates substantial problems for duration analysis.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the data. Section 3 
describes the wage bargaining process in these industries. Section 4 describes the   
multivariate duration model and the variables used. Section 5 presents the results. Based 
on these estimates, mean and median durations are estimated for several periods for 
firms that participated in the business cycle survey during these periods in order to gain 
an impression of the impact of state-dependent price setting in this historic situation. 
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2 The  data 
The data source is the monthly business cycle survey for manufacturing from the 
ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Ifo Institute) in Munich from January 1980 to 
November 2001. A translated version of the questionnaire can be found in annex III. For 
topics as “Who answers the questionnaire” or “How do firms interpret specific 
questions” see Lindlbauer (1989) and the references cited therein. The subsample of the 
data for metal-working industries in West Germany contains 380,000 observations. 
Firms are asked at plant level. Each plant has a special identifier. Plants report for 144 
narrow product groups. Some plants report for several product groups. Thus the plant 
identifier is not unique. Only the combination of the plant identifier and the code for the 
product group allows an unambiguous identification. Therefore this combination 
constitutes the identifier for the unit under investigation in this study. If the product 
group of a plant changes, the second part of this unique identifier is modified. The 
sample is not random but by purpose. Big plants are overrepresented. The number of 
participants fell from about 2,400 in 1980 (monthly average) to 800 in 2001. The data 
set is organised as a panel. If large plants do not answer, they are called by phone and 
asked to fill in the questionnaire. Once every quarter or half year it is investigated which 
firms had stopped reporting. A reminder is send to them and if they still do not report 
for about three months they are removed from the address list. Thus, if spells are 
interrupted, this is most likely for a period of one or two months. Tables A1 to A3 in the 
appendix provide some information on the length of participation. 
The somewhat peculiar phrasing of question 7 in the questionnaire (see annex III) 
“Allowing for changes in sales conditions, our domestic sales prices (net) for XY 
compared to the past month were raised, left unchanged, reduced” was introduced 
during the early 1950s. At that time, researchers compared the answers of the business 
cycle survey with the official PPI by plotting the monthly share of plants with price 
increases and the share of plants with price reductions against the change in the official 
PPI. Their idea was that if all prices are changed by the same amount, then the balances 
of price increases and price reductions should be proportional to the change in the PPI 
(Langelütke, 1951). They noticed that in the business cycle survey in January too many 
price changes were reported compared with the Producer Price Index. They assumed 
that plants reported list prices and contacted some plants for their interpretation. One 
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contact person proposed the actual wording. Since the official producer price index and 
the estimated index from the survey data have roughly been in line since that time, 
nobody wants to change the wording again, even if it is only possible to state the 
intention behind the wording rather than what it really means.   
There is no additional information on price changes beyond the answers to 
question 7 in the questionnaire. From four face-to-face interviews it can be presumed 
that firms do report for a ‘representative’ product. If a product is modified due to 
customer wishes it will be abstracted from the additional features. If a product is new, 
either no price change is reported or, if it accounts for only a small percentage of total 
sales, it is ignored. In case of quantity discounts there are often different lot sizes with a 
specific but fixed discount so that just one price change has to be reported.  
Further monthly questions concern changes in demand (Q. 4) and inventories of 
finished products (Q. 3). In addition, there is a monthly question on expectations for the 
next six months on the “business sentiment” (Q. 12). Following other studies, e. g. 
König and Seitz (1991), the expectations on business sentiment serve as a proxy 
variable for expected demand. Additionally, there are quarterly quantitative questions 
on capacity utilisation. The item non-response rate for the quarterly questions is much 
higher than for the monthly qualitative questions. Unfortunately, there is no information 
on costs in the survey. Aggregated data has to be used instead. 
2.1 Price spells 
Since firms stop or interrupt reporting for a specific product group from time to 
time, some spells are right-censored. Thus, firm-specific information can only be 
collected until the time shortly before the censoring occurs. Therefore, in this study the 
additional assumption is made that prices are fixed one period in advance and that the 
firms’ decision is based mainly on information that is available to the firm the month 
before the actual price change happens. By the same token, expectations are formed 
shortly before the price changes. Contemporaneous effects can only be taken into 
account if they are not firm-specific, for example, a collectively negotiated wage 
increase in May can be already coded in April. A complete price spell starts with a price 
change and ends shortly before the next price change.  
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By comparing actual and planned price changes it is possible to assess in a model-
free way how much information is contained in the data prior to the month of the price 
change. Table A4 shows that while it is a rare occurrence for a price increase not to 
have been anticipated the three preceding months beforehand, in every second case a 
price reduction has not been planned. The share of planned (expected) price changes, 
both increases or decreases, that were not realised within the three following months is 
equally high. Thus, an approach neglecting contemporaneous information may have 
difficulties explaining price reductions. 
2.2 Price durations and hazard rates 
The Calvo-model provides a good starting point for a first look at the data. It 
assumes an equal and constant probability for each firm of receiving a price signal given 
that it had not received a signal since the last price change. This “probability” is called 
hazard rate (see annex I for further details). The Calvo assumption can be investigated 
by allowing for hazard rates that are not constant. For example, hazard rates may vary 
with respect to the duration of the price spell or may depend on the sign of the actual 
and/or preceding price change. Assume for the moment that price increases take place 
all at once and price reductions in several small steps. Then the hazard rates depend on 
the sign of the actual price change in the event of a price increase and they depend on 
the sign of the preceding price change if it was a reduction since adjustment is not 
completed after the first price reduction. It should be obvious that there is a problem if 
price spells are left-censored. Then the hazard rate cannot be conditioned on the time 
since the preceding price change. Therefore left-censored spells are ignored under the 
assumption of independent censoring.  
Figure A1 in the annex presents the four hazard rates for pure sequences of price 
increases and price reductions and mixed sequences of price increases and reductions. 
Price spells are ignored if there are more than two price changes without a month of no 
price change in between, since these price spells do not fit well in the multivariate 
analysis pursued in section 4. According to figure A1 there is a large likelihood that a 
price increase is followed by another price increase after 11, 12 or 13 months. The 
likelihood of a price reduction, given that the preceding price change was a reduction, is 
much smaller and the hazard rate is more or less flat. If the preceding price change was 
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ECB
Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005 
a reduction, the likelihood of a price increase is very low and the hazard rate is flat 
whereas a further price reduction is quite likely in the first four months but definitely 
not after six months. Is this evidence of price reductions occurring in several small 
steps? Strictly speaking, it is not since it cannot be inferred from this figure whether 
there are a) different types of price setters, each reducing its price in one single step but 
one type after say two months, another type after, say, three months or b) only one type 
of price setter but reducing its price in several small steps, say, in three steps, the first 
after one month, the second after two months and the third after one month again. By 
the same token, it cannot be said whether there are three types of price setters, the first 
one only increasing its prices, the second only reducing its prices and the third one 
always changing sign. But clearly, there is not just one type of price setter receiving a 
price signal with a constant hazard rate as assumed by Calvo. In the case of a price 
increase following a price increase, it has to be noted that there are also a lot of short 
spells so that there appears to be lump-sum adjustment as well as incremental 
adjustment. At least, there are short durations too. A potential explanation is collective 
wage bargaining in the industries under scrutiny. Therefore the next section describes 
the collective wage bargaining procedure in more detail. 
3  Collective wage bargaining in the metal-working industries 
Wage setting in the metal-working industries of western Germany is highly 
synchronised
1. According to Kohaut and Schnabel (2001) 42 percent of firms and 66 
percent of employees were covered by the collective agreement in 2000. An additional 
30 percent of firms with 19 percent of employees applied the union wage rate without 
contractual obligation. Larger firms apply the union wage rate more often than the 
smaller firms. In the sample, larger firms are overrepresented. Hence, in the business 
survey most firms should be subject to the union wage contract. If domestic costs, 
wages and intermediate inputs were a major determinant of price changes, one would 
expect a high degree of synchronisation in price setting within the metal-working 
industries. The usual duration of wage contracts is 12 months. Sometimes there are 
longer wage contracts, for example for 36 months, with wage increases taking place 
13
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every 12 months. These agreed wages can serve as proxies for expected marginal costs, 
for both the econometrician and the firm owner. To explain the modalities of collective 
wage bargaining in the metal-working industries, the negotiation round in 2002 is 
briefly described. This round was chosen, though the dataset ends in 2001, since it 
includes all features of interest. This is not the case in every round.  
The general procedure was agreed upon by the trade union and the employers 
federation in 1979. It is 
1.  The trade union makes its claim public four weeks before the contract expires. 
2.  Negotiations start two weeks before the contract expires.  
3.  Strikes are not permitted within four weeks after the contract expires. 
In the 2002 negotiation round, the preceding agreement ended on 28 February 2002. 
The round started informally on 10  December 2001 when the trade union’s board 
announced its recommendation: a range of between 5% and 7% and a duration of 12 
months. It was motivated by an expected inflation rate of up to 2% in 2002 and an 
expected economy-wide productivity increase of up to 2%. “The rest is redistribution 
and backlog demand.” Experience shows that the final result is about half, i.e. 3.0%. 
What was exceptional in this round was the sudden failure of the negotiation process 
because of rivalries within the trade union and the first strikes for many years.  
The main stages were 
10 December 2001  wage demand recommended by the trade union’s board: 5% - 7% 
28 January 2002  official wage demand: 6.5% 
7 February 2002  start of negotiations in Bavaria 
15  March  2002  initial offer from employers in Baden-Württemberg: 2% from 
March 2002 and an additional 2% from March 2003  
28 March 2002  first warning strikes 
19 April 2002  failure of negotiations in Baden-Württemberg 
                                                                                                                                               
1 This is different in other industries. There all regions normally apply the same percentage increase in 
basic wages but the date of the increase and other parts of the contracts depend on the weakness of the 
regions’ firms relative to the strongest region. 
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25 – 30 April 2002  first trade union ballot (on strike): 90% yes vote 
6 May 2002  start of strikes 
15 May 2002  restart of negotiations and pilot agreement in Baden-Württemberg 
21 – 25 May 2002  second trade union ballot (on agreement): 57% yes vote 
The final agreement was: March and April 2002, no wage increase; in May a 
lump-sum payment of €120; from June 2002 4.0%; and from June 2003 an additional 
3.1%. Duration 22 months (March 2002 – December 2003). A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation yields a 3¼% wage increase per year. That is ¼% higher than first expected, 
based on the recommendation on 10 December
 2001, but fits well within the official 
wage demand.  
Table A5 summarises the wage bargaining process for the years from 1980 to 
2001. It shows that wages are increased normally after 10 to 13 months. Figure A2 
shows, using “Machinery” as an example, that prices increases and price reductions 
follow a different pattern. The vertical lines represent the months during which wage 
increases have taken place. Prices are revised upwards mainly between January and the 
month of an increase in payments. During the periods of long-term wage contracts it 
was comparatively easy for firms to form expectations on the increase in marginal costs. 
However, figure A2 shows no different pricing pattern during the periods of long-term 
wage contracts. Whether the durations of wage contracts or the seasonal pattern is able 
to explain the durations of the price spells will be analysed by the multivariate analysis 
in the next section. There, not only the incidence of wage changes is taken into account 
but also the amount. 
4  An empirical model for explaining price changes 
The descriptive analysis so far has given some indication of potential factors 
influencing the price-setting decision. In this section the data is analysed within the 
framework of a multivariate duration model. The model is empirical. The hazard rate, 
that is a constant in the Calvo-model by assumption, is allowed to vary with variables 
that try to capture several aspects of price setting, with an emphasis on time versus 
state-dependence and competitive behaviour.  
15
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4.1 Econometric specification 
Let  t Y  denote a random variable that is  
reduction   price
increase   price










k  (1) 
The probability that firm i  increases (reduces) its price at period t  given that the 
preceding price change was an increase (reduction) is 
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In case of right-censoring all that is known is that the price is changed at a later 
point in time  
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Therefore, if  1 = i δ  for a completed spell and  0 = i δ  for a right-censored spell, 
the log-likelihood contribution of firm i is  
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Ignoring the right-censored spells would result in a less efficient estimation and 
might even cause a selection bias.  
 

























 (5)  
The hazard function is parameterised conditional on several variables X  that are 
discussed in the next subsection. The baseline hazard λ  is specified non-parametrically 
through monthly dummies since a parametric function may be too restrictive. A 
parametric setup may lead to unobserved heterogeneity that becomes unimportant if a 
non-parametric specification is used instead (Han and Hausman, 1990). Since modelling 
unobserved heterogeneity is not straightforward in the case of censored multiple spells 
(van den Berg, 2001) a further attempt has been undertaken to reduce unobserved 
heterogeneity so that ignoring the remainder may be acceptable. A potential source of 
what may show up in the regressions as unobserved heterogeneity is a large share of 
spells lasting only one month. Therefore, for estimation, series of more than two 
consecutive price changes have been ignored. These spells may reflect incremental price 
adjustment caused by convex adjustment costs. Including these spells would make it 
necessary to model the switch between lump-sum and incremental price change. 
Interesting as it is it is beyond the scope of this paper and the number of such cases is 
too small anyway.  
An additional problem is a potential selectivity bias due to length-based sampling 
that would result in an oversampling of short spells. As a robustness check, all 
estimations have been performed on a subset of the data that was restricted to series of 
at least 48 contingent months without non-response. Almost no differences could be 
detected.  
4.2 Economic specification 
The available individual data is most informative on the demand side. The 
demand change since the last price change is constructed as the sum of the demand 
changes where a demand increase compared with the previous month is set to 1 and a 
demand decrease to -1. This variable measures the shift in the level of demand. If 
demand first increases by one unit and then decreases again by one unit, demand is at 
the same level as at the beginning, although over the whole period one additional unit 
has been produced. Expected business situation for the following six months (up, down, 
equal) is taken as a proxy for demand expectations. It is assumed that the firm’s 
expectation is not conditioned on its own price decision, meaning that the answer in the 
business survey refers to Y  but not to 
d Y . Since price changes of domestic competitors 
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are included in the regression, the share of domestic competitors with increasing and 
decreasing demand is also included to account for common demand shocks.  
Since the data does not contain individual information on costs, the construction 
of the respective variables deserves some comment. Price indices for imported and 
domestic intermediate inputs have been calculated using input-output tables and the 
respective sub-indices of the respective official price index.
2 A price change of 
intermediate inputs in the model has been calculated as the log difference of the level of 
the index at the current time to the level of the index preceding the firm’s last price 
change.
3 This is justified as follows. The firm takes its actual costs at the last price 
calculation that is assumed to have been taken place the month before the last price 
change and adds the additional costs due to the change in the price of intermediate 
inputs. It applies a fixed mark-up on unit costs so that the mark-up can be ignored in the 
calculation of growth rates. The mark-up is large enough to account for volatility in the 
prices of intermediate inputs. If, other things being equal, these input prices increase too 
much, the product price will be raised as in an () S s,  model. One can either assume that 
the firm expects the input prices to stay constant or change at the same rate as assumed 
for the last price calculation. That is the more satisfactory explanation Cecchetti (1985) 
refers to. This does not correspond exactly to rational expectations, but may serve as a 
second-best solution. Owing to the backward-looking nature, it should already create 
some persistence.  
The inclusion of wages is more complex. In section 3 the potential influence of 
the collective wage bargaining process was emphasised. In the basic Taylor-model the 
price is increased every time a new wage contract starts, and wage contracts have a 
fixed duration. In this model, because the collective wage bargaining process consists of 
various steps, it is represented by a set of dummies: one dummy variable for the formal 
start of a new contract (i.e. the end of the previous contract), another for the month of 
the actual wage increase, a further dummy for the months in between and a separate 
dummy for the month of an increase during a long-term wage contract, i.e. for a wage 
                                                 
2   The weights from the IO tables that are published every other year have been linearly interpolated to 
create monthly weights. In 1995 there was a change in the industry classification to Nace and from 
West German data to pan-German data. The respective price series and IO weights have been linked in 
1995 to back estimate series in Nace classification. 
3   The input price series have been smoothed by an HP filter. 
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increase that was known more than 12 months in advance and that takes place in a year 
where there are no negotiations and the other collective wage bargaining dummies are 
therefore zero. Since there is just one collective wage agreement in the industries under 
review, an overlap of contracts due to wage contracts can only occur if several stages of 
the wage bargaining process are relevant for price setting.  
The dummies do not account for variations in the amount of the wage increase. 
Therefore an additional variable for wages has to be constructed. There are three 
sources for aggregate data on wages: the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly index for 
collectively negotiated wages, yearly effective wages for two-digit industries from the 
National Accounts of the Federal Statistical Office and monthly effective wages for 
four-digit industries from the Monthly Manufacturing Survey (Monatsbericht im 
Verabeitenden Gewerbe). The index of negotiated wages does not account for changes 
in the labour force during the duration of a contract. It is therefore more rigid than an 
index for effective wages. On the other hand, the negotiated wage increase is common 
knowledge to all domestic parties involved in business activity. Monthly effective 
wages, even if seasonally adjusted, may be too flexible. They ignore the long-term 
relationship inherent in most labour contracts. As Kimball (1995) put it: “True marginal 
labor costs are a matter of the additional amount a firm is implicitly promising to pay a 
worker someday in return for working an additional hour.” Prices may not rise because 
people are paid bonuses but bonuses may be paid at the time prices can be raised 
because demand is high. As an advantage, this kind of data already includes adjustment 
in the labour force as a result of wage increases that cannot be compensated for by 
higher product prices. A major drawback of the wages from the Monthly Manufacturing 
Survey is that there is no ready available measure for the productivity change in these 
industries. The yearly wages of the National Accounts do not suffer from this 
shortcoming. The National Accounts provide data on gross value added corresponding 
to the wages (labour costs) and therefore allow the calculation of the change in  labour 
productivity and in unit labour costs. However, one major drawback is a break in the 
series in 1995. Later, wages are reported for Germany as a whole and according to Nace 
Rev. 1. Before that, wages were reported for western Germany and according to a 
different classification that cannot be reconciled with Nace at the two-digit level. 
Therefore the two-digit industries have to be aggregated even further.  
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Wages have been included in the model in two variants. The first one is 
backward-looking and parallels the calculation of the changes in intermediate input 
prices, i.e. the log level shift is calculated. The alternative is forward-looking. For every 
month the cumulative wage rate for the next 12 months compared with the preceding 12 
months is calculated.
4  
The share of domestic competitors with price increases and price reductions has 
been broken down in the contemporaneous change, the one period lagged change and in 
the change since the firm’s last price change until two periods before the current period. 
The shares are calculated within four-digit industries (according to Nace Rev.1) by 
ignoring the own firm according to equation A15 in annex I. The price changes of 
foreign competitors have been calculated based on the input-output tables. 
An output gap variable is calculated by subtracting the firm-specific mean from 
the firm-specific capacity utilisation. An additional question asks whether technical 
capacity given actual output and expected orders within the following 12 months is not 
sufficient, sufficient or more than sufficient. From this variable the net share of 
domestic competitors with not sufficient, sufficient and more than sufficient capacity is 
calculated within four-digit industries (according to Nace Rev.1) by ignoring the own 
firm. This share is split into two variables, depending on whether the number of firms  
reporting that their capacity will not be sufficient is larger than the number of firms 
reporting that their capacity will be more than sufficient or not (s. equation A15).  
In addition to these variables dummy variables for industries, size class and 
whether the firm exports or not have routinely been included in the regression for 
accounting for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity. They are not discussed further. All 
nominal variables except the expected wage increases have been divided by the PPI to 
cope with collinearity problems. Since neither unit labour costs nor labour productivity 
and corresponding wages taken separately turned out to be significant they are not 
reported in table A8. The same is the case with monthly backward-looking wages. For a 
complete list of variables that are used in the regressions, see Table A6. 
 
                                                 
4 Cumulative wage sum during 12 months over cumulative employment during the same 12 months. 
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5 Results 
The foremost question is whether price setting is purely time-dependent or if there 
is an additional state-dependent element and, if there is state-dependence, whether it 
really matters. The answer to the first question is discussed next, based on the estimated 
coefficients for the hazard functions. This discussion represents, at the same time, the 
micro perspective of the data since it tries to explain the heterogeneity within the micro 
data. A measure of the goodness of fit is the adjusted R-squared for the hazard function 
estimation. Gauging the importance of the contribution of state dependence is 
something different. In the aggregate, purely idiosyncratic changes may cancel out and 
the R-squared of the hazard rate estimation is not the appropriate measure anymore. 
Instead, this paper takes a more pragmatic approach. For four different periods 
individual survivor functions are estimated on a subsample of firms and aggregated 
(averaged) within these periods
5,6. The locations of the distributions are characterised by 
their mean and median durations and the dispersion by the first and third quartiles so 
that the interquartile range can be calculated. The survivor functions including both 
state-dependent and time-dependent variables are then compared to the survivor 
functions including only time-dependent variables
7. It turns out that idiosyncratic 
demand decreases are the most important source of price reductions whereas common 
factors, as common demand shocks, specific months of collective wage bargaining, 
price changes of domestic competitors, the general increase in the PPI and, last but not 
least, seasonality make price increases more likely.   
5.1  State-dependence vs. time-dependence – the micro perspective 
In stochastic terms, the sequence of price changes can be seen as a renewal 
process with two “states”: “price increase” and “price reduction” with four possible 
transitions: increase-reduction, reduction-reduction, reduction-increase and increase-
increase. The next four subsections are devoted to these transitions, i.e. to the columns 
of Table A8. Although path dependence is not modelled explicitly, it is best to 
understand and to describe these transitions as going through a business cycle.  
                                                 
5 The subsample of firms does not have to be identical for the three periods but is constant within each 
period. 
6 Note that this corresponds to calculating marginal effects. 
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5.1.1 A price reduction following a price increase 
The estimates reveal that falling demand, expected (demexp
8) or experienced 
(dem), and stocks of finished products (stocks) that are presumed to be too large appear 
to be the only reason why a firm starts to reduce its price after a preceding increase. 
Firms do not take into account variables that relate to other firms such as the demand 
changes faced by domestic competitors (demcomp) that may serve as a proxy for the 
business cycle. That non-exporting firms (export) are more likely to reduce their prices 
after a preceding increase should be a statistical artefact. This corroborates Golosov and 
Lucas (2003) finding that idiosyncratic shocks matter. As regards time-dependence, 
price reductions are less likely in December. The baseline hazard function is constant. 
Thus a price reduction after a preceding price increase is equally likely in every period, 
conditional on all the other variables.  
5.1.2 A price reduction following a price reduction 
If the firm’s own demand shrinks (dem) or is expected to do so (demexp) prices 
are likely to be reduced. Capacity becomes underutilised and if it is assumed that this 
lasts for a longer period, i.e. if the technical capacity of the own firm, given actual and 
expected orders within the next 12 months (capexpown), is more than sufficient, price 
reductions will go on
9. In this situation, the firm starts taking the behaviour of its 
competitors into account. If domestic competitors faced increasing demand (demcomp) 
during the preceding month, firms are less likely to reduce prices further. If domestic 
competitors (pricedomcomp1) reduce their prices, firms reduce their prices, too, but 
only within the same month (pricedomcomp1). A possible interpretation is that firms 
want to signal that they are not interested in a price war but will nonetheless retaliate if 
a competitor reduces its price. Figure A3 shows that short spells dominate over long 
spells. In other words, if firms think it is necessary to reduce the price further they do 
not hesitate to do so. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
7 Since the survivor function is 1 minus the distribution function, comparing the survivor functions is not 
different from comparing the distribution functions. 
8 Variable names in brackets refer to variables or groups of variables in table A8. 
9 Only coefficients that are significant at the 5 per cent level are taken into account. 
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5.1.3 A price increase following a price reduction 
If plants have experienced demand increases (dem) since their last price reduction, 
they are more likely to increase prices. This effect is amplified by increasing demand 
faced by domestic competitors (demcomp). Expected demand decreases (demexp) have 
an opposite effect. On the cost side, cost increases above the general increase of the 
producer price index (cost) have no impact yet the increase in the PPI itself since the 
firm’s last price change raises the likelihood of a price increase. Collective wage 
bargaining (wagebarg) starts to matter too, particularly the month of the formal start of 
the contract and the mid-term permanent wage increase during a long term contract. 
Additionally, firms react to price increases (reductions) by domestic competitors 
(pricedomcomp1) with a higher (lower) likelihood of increasing prices within the same 
month. The sign of the coefficient of the impact of the price change of foreign 
competitors (priceforcomp) is counterintuitive. A possible interpretation is that firms 
collude in the case of domestic competitors but compete with foreign competitors. Yet 
this may simply be a statistical artefact. 
A price increase following a price reduction is more likely if the length of the 
present and the preceding price spell are both twelve months or if its own length and the 
length of the preceding spell, taken together, add to twelve months. Both effects are not 
as important as the coefficient might suggest since, technically speaking, the constant is 
so low. In the last case, probably, the firm changes its price regularly after twelve 
months if it increases its price, but falling demand forced it to cut its price irregularly. In 
other words, the first price change is made in response to an external shock, it is state-
dependent, and the second price change is made in accordance with a time-dependent 
rule. In the absence of the time-dependent price change, the next price change would be 
farther away and thus the price more sticky.   
5.1.4 A price increase following a price increase 
As opposed to the latter case, idiosyncratic demand changes since the firm’s last 
price change (dem) do not matter anymore, yet an expected demand increase (demexp) 
raises the likelihood of a price increase as does increasing (contemporaneous) demand 
faced by domestic competitors (demcomp). The effect of decreasing lagged demand by 
domestic competitors may be a statistical artefact. 
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On the cost side, again, cost increases above the general increase of the producer 
price index (cost) have no impact, but the increase in the PPI itself since the firm’s last 
price change raises the likelihood of a price increase. Surprisingly, expected change in 
real wages (cost) has no impact on the likelihood of price increases either. Perhaps the 
wage share is too small in the industries under review. But, as expected, the likelihood 
of a repeated price increase rises during the specific months of the collective wage 
negotiations (wagebarg). The impact is the strongest if the month of an increase in the 
wage is known in advance during a long-term wage contract. Reducing customer anger 
(Rotemberg, 2002) may be a major reason for raising prices at a point of time at which 
every customer knows that costs are rising for suppliers. Another reason may be 
mitigating coordination failure: Firms may fear to lose customers in the event of a price 
increase if competitors do not raise their prices as well (Ball and Romer, 1991).  
Capacity (over-) underutilisation (cap) (increases) lowers the likelihood of a price 
increase. It increases, too, if technical capacity given actual and expected orders within 
the next 12 months (capexpown) is not sufficient. If the share of competitors with 
expected capacity constraints (capexpcomp) increases, the likelihood of a price change 
increases, and if the share of competitors with spare capacity increases, the likelihood of 
a price increase decreases. If stocks of finished products (stocks) are too small price 
increases are more likely. This means that changes in stocks are not the consequence of 
price changes but prices change in order to smooth stocks. If competitors raise (reduce) 
their prices (pricedomcomp1), firms are more likely to raise (reduce) their prices within 
the same month.  
A price increase following a price increase is more likely if the length of the 
present and the preceding spell are both twelve months or if its own length and the 
length of the preceding spell, taken together, add up to twelve months. Now, the impact 
matters, since the constant is much larger than in the preceding case. While the impact 
of the state-dependent factors is not really surprising if a price increase follows a price 
increase, the time-dependence is crucial to the whole price-setting process as will be 
seen in the next subsections. Even after taking many variables into account, it is still 
much more likely that a price increase will follow a price increase after 1, 4, 5, 8, 9 
quarters and so on than after 2, 3, 6, 7 … quarters. In the case of the spike of the 
baseline hazard function at 12 months there is no one-to-one relation with a price 
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increase each January, since this is already captured by the relevant seasonal dummy. 
There is a higher probability that prices are changed in January. But price increases in 
January do not end only price spells of 12 month length but spells with a length of 
3 months, 7 months, etc.., too, and all durations with almost equal probability. By the 
same token, there is no one-to-one relation with yearly wage contracts nor do all spells 
with a duration of 12 months belong to firms that change their prices only at 12 month 
intervals, since this is captured by a dummy-variable, which is significant. This is 
puzzling at first sight. But suppose, in the case of spells with a length of 12 months, that 
every firm always changes its price after 12 months and that most of the price changes 
take place during the first quarter of the year. Then some firms would always be price 
leaders and others always price followers. This could offend competitors. Thus, on the 
individual level, firms show a more regular, more time-dependent price setting pattern 
during periods when they can increase prices several times. Their behaviour is more 
state-dependent during other periods. 
In order to gain an impression of the contribution of state dependence to the 
adjustment of prices, various survivor functions have been estimated for three different 
periods: November 1986 to February 1990, November 1989 to February 1993 and 
November 1992 to February 1995. The first period was chosen because it covers a long-
term wage contract. Furthermore, during the first period the frequency of price increases 
and the fourth period was mixed. The estimations are performed for firms that 
participated during the whole period so that information for all of the conditioning 
variables is available. The sample is further restricted to the cohort of firms with a price 
change in October, roughly 60 firms in each period. Starting in November, the survivor 
functions for the next forty months are estimated based on the estimated hazard 
functions. All regressors except those representing the history of the firms’ own price 
setting (see table A8 in the appendix) have been taken into account. 
5.2.1 Time-dependence  
In a first step a model with four components has been estimated as a benchmark. 
In addition to the constant term sets of dummy variables for industries, different months 
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5.2 State-dependence vs. time-dependence – the aggregate perspective  
was increasing, during the second period decreasing, the third period covers a recession  
and durations since the last price change (the baseline hazards) have been included. 
Further, a survivor function under Calvo’s assumption of a constant hazard rate has 
been estimated. According to figure A4 the baseline hazards are more important than 
the seasonal dummies. The reason is the regular increase and decrease of the baseline 
hazard for price increases following price increases (see figure A5 and 5.1.4). The latter 
situation clearly dominates the price setting. The median under the Calvo assumption 
(5.7 months) is much smaller than the median under a non-constant hazard function (8.7 
months). This may also explain the Bils and Klenows (2004) finding of a short 
adjustment period. Their estimates are based on a constant hazard function. Price 
increases are more frequent than price reductions. Most price reductions are observed 
within four months whereas price increases are observed either within three months or 
after 10 to 15 months (see figure A6).  
5.2.2 The contribution of state-dependence 
The estimation of the transition intensities involves a lot of variables, partly to 
take account of otherwise unobserved heterogeneity that should have resulted in steeper 
baseline hazard functions. The impact of these individual variables on the transition 
intensities has been discussed in section 5.1. This subsection groups variables together 
according to their economic content (s. table A6 in the appendix). It starts with a 
comparison of the purely time-dependent survivor function and the state-dependent 
survivor functions. Afterwards the importance of idiosyncratic vs. common shocks etc. 
is investigated.    
The resulting survivor functions are shown in figure A8
10. The solid line 
represents the survivor function using time dependent variables only. The median 
duration (Prob=.50) is 5 months compared with 7-8 months for state-dependence and 
the mean is 8.7 months compared with 11-18 months. Deviations from the state-
dependent survival functions are substantial with the exception of 1989, during the 
German unification boom.  
In order to gain an impression of the impact of various explanations the estimated 
coefficients in table A8 are used to first calculate the “conditional” time-dependent 
survivor function and, for example, a survivor function that includes the time-dependent 
                                                 
10 Owing to limitations on space, the survivor function starting 1995 is not shown. But see table A7. 
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part and the variables representing customer anger. Table A7 lists the quartiles and the 
mean of the durations.   
According to the results, preventing customer anger has almost no impact. The 
median duration is about 1-2 weeks shorter than the conditional time-dependence and 
the mean 3-4 weeks. The interquartile range is reduced by 6 weeks. Idiosyncratic shocks 
reduce the adjustment period by roughly 6 weeks (see also figure A9). Common shocks 
make adjustment faster in 1989, during the German unification boom. The impact of 
competition is most severely felt in 1992 when it considerably slows down adjustment 
(see figure A10). The variables that are related to () S s, -type models lead to results that 
are similar to the competition variables (see figure A11). This does not occur by chance, 
since there is an overlap of variables. The price changes of domestic competitors are 
included under competition as well as under () S s, -type models and under common 
shocks. The capacity constraint of domestic competitors is included under common 
shocks as well as under competition and the cumulative price change by foreign 
competitors are included under competition as well as under () S s, -type models. In 
order to disentangle these groups a separate analysis is performed for these variables. 
Capacity constraints of competitors do not have much impact. The major effect comes 
from foreign competition. It makes adjustment slower in the observed periods.  
6  Summary and conclusions 
For the “metal-working industries” in western Germany an empirical duration 
model is estimated. The data source is a panel of product groups from a monthly 
business survey for German manufacturing that covers the period from 1980 to 2001. 
The analysis is restricted to lump-sum price adjustment.  
Price setting turns out to be state-dependent as well as time-dependent but time-
dependence dominates. Time-dependence is most prevalent when a price increase 
follows a price increase. Then price increases are very likely to happen during the fourth 
and fifth quarter after the preceding price increase. A lag of 12 months is quite common, 
even if seasonal effects and wage negotiations are accounted for. Despite the strong 
time-dependence almost every type of opportunity to justify a price increase is used by 
at least some firms. However, on average, durations are not much affected. For 
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example, price increases at specific months related to the collective wage negotiations 
reduce median adjustment by just one to two weeks. The reason may be, that relatively 
important opportunities like increases in collectively negotiated wages or price increases 
by competitors allow firms to coordinate their price increases. A firm that otherwise 
would have changed its price e.g. in June, after 14 months, now uses the opportunity 
that a lot of competitors change their prices in April to change its price two months in 
advance. Another firm would have changed its price  after seven months in March but 
waits for fear of losing market share and changes its price with a postponement of 
two months. In the aggregate, state-dependence averages out. Evidence on cost push in 
kind of () S s, -models is only limited, since the estimation of mean and median durations 
have been performed under more or less historical conditions and, during the periods 
observed, cost increases were relatively small. 
State-dependence seems crucial when prices are reduced or a price increase 
follows a price reduction. Prices reductions take place if demand has decreased since the 
preceding price change or demand is expected to decrease. Price changes in reaction to 
idiosyncratic demand shocks do not cancel out. They reduce the aggregate duration of 
price changes. If competitors reduce their prices and the firm’s last price change has 
already been a reduction it cuts its price further, probably for fear of losing market 
share. The timing of a price reduction is not affected by cost changes. Cost reductions 
do not decrease prices but temporarily increase profits. Idiosyncratic cost shocks cannot 
be observed owing to data limitations.  
While the business cycle survey data used in this paper are suited for the analysis 
of when, why and how often prices change, they give only a limited answer to the 
question why prices do not change. There are indications for coordination failure and 
fairness considerations but the results are not clear cut. For this reason the participants 
of the business cycle survey have been contacted in a special survey on price rigidity. 
The respective dataset can be merged with the business cycle survey. This will be 





Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005 
References 
Ball, L. and D. Romer, 1991, “Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 81 No. 3, 539-552 
Bils, M. and P. Klenow, 2004, “Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices”, 
Journal of Political Economy. 2004, 112(5), 947-85 
Calvo, G. A., 1983, “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 12(3): 383-98 
Caplin, A. and J. Leahy, 1991, “State-dependent Pricing and the Dynamics of Money 
and Output”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, 683-708 
Caplin, A. and Spulber, 1987, “Menu Costs and the Neutrality of Money”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1987, vol. 102, 703-726. 
Cecchetti, S. G., 1985, “The Frequency of Price Adjustments: A Study of the 
Newsstand Prices of Magazines”, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 31, 255-274 
Golosov, M. and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 2003, “Menu Costs and Phillips Curves”, NBER 
Working Paper, No. 10187 
Han, A. and J. A. Hausman, 1990, „Flexible Parametric Estimation of Duration and 
Competing Risk Models“, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 5, 1-28 
Kalbfleisch, J. and R. Prentice, 1980, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, 
New York: Wiley 
Kimball, M., 1995, “The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist Model”, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 27, 1241-1277 
Klenow, P. and O. Kryvtsov, “State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing: Does it 
Matter for Recent U:S. Inflation”, mimeo,   
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~oleksiy/research/research.htm 
König, H. and H. Seitz, 1991, “Production and Price Smoothing by Inventory 
Adjustment?”, Empirical Economics, 16, 233-252 
Kohaut, S., and C. Schnabel, 2001, “Tarifverträge - nein danke!? Einflussfaktoren der 
Tarifbindung west- und ostdeutscher Betriebe”, Discussion Papers No. 8, 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg 
Lancaster, T., 1990, The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge 
University Press 
Langelütke, H., W. Marquardt and O. Anderson, 1951, Das Konjunktur-Test-Verfahren 
u. seine wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Bedeutung, München, Schriftenreihe d. Ifo-
Inst. f. Wirtschaftsforschung, Band 13 
Lindlbauer, J. D., 1989, „Die Umfragen des ifo-Instituts: Fragestellung, Datenerfassung 
und Auswertung“ in „Handbuch der Ifo-Umfragen“, by: Karl Heinrich 
Oppenländer, Günter Poser (eds.), Duncker & Humblot / Berlin-München 
Rotemberg, J.J., 2002, “Customer Anger at Price Increases, Time Variation in the 




Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005 
Taylor, J. B., 1980, “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 88, 1-23 
Van den Berg, G. J., 2001, “Duration models: Specification, identification and multiple 
durations.“ In J.J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, 









Working Paper Series No. 534
October 2005 
Annex I - Formulas 
Discrete duration model and hazard rate: 
 
The statistical model underlying the analysis in this paper is an extension of the tossing 
of a coin n times. Let  t Y  denote a random variable that is 1 if a price change (= 
“head”) occurs in the t th throw and 0 if no price change (= “tail”) occurs. 
change   not does    price







t Y ,        n t , , 1 K =  (A1) 
The probability that a price is held constant for t  periods and then changes is given by 
the probability that the preceding price change happened in period 0, is changed in 
period t  and is not changed at any period in between. 
() 1 0 0 1 Pr 0 1 1 = = ∧ ∧ = ∧ = − Y Y Y Y t t K  (A2) 
In order to estimate this probability define the so called “hazard rate”  t h  that is the 
probability of a price change in period t  under the condition that it has not been 
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Let T  be a random variable that denotes the time when a price change takes place the 
first time and define the so called “survivor function”  () t S  through the probability that 
the process has not stopped before time t  
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() ( ) t T t S ≥ = Pr . (A4) 



















where  f  and F are the density and the cumulative density of T , the duration of the 
price spell. Since the survivor function is one minus the distribution function it contains 
the same information. The first quartile, median and third quartile of the survivor 
function is the third quartile, median and first quartile of the distribution function. The 
inter quartile range is therefore the same.  
The probability that a price is changed after T periods and not before equals 
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As usual in binary models covariates can be taken into account by parameterising the 















where  t X  is now a matrix of covariates that may also include time-varying covariates. 
To avoid endogeneity problems  X  should not include elements that depend on the 
decision under scrutiny.  t λ  is a constant that may be different for every time t . β  is a 
vector of parameters that are assumed to be constant for all times t . Of course, one 
could estimate a different β  for every t , but then there would be no efficiency gain 
over separate binary regressions for every t .  
Again, this model can be extended by discriminating between price increases and price 
reductions. Ignore for the moment covariates. Let there be  1 + = m K  different states: 
reduction   price
increase   price










k  (A8) 
The probability that a price is increased the first time after t  periods given that the 
preceding price spell ended in a price reduction is     
() k Y Y Y l Y t t = = ∧ ∧ = ∧ = − 0 1 1 0 0 Pr K  (A9) 
with  2 = k and  1 = l . And the hazard rate is  
()
[] () k Y Y Y Y Y Y
k Y Y Y l Y
h
t t t t
t t kl
t = = ∧ ∧ = ∧ = ∨ = ∨ =











The probability that a price is increased after T periods and not before given that the 
preceding price spell ended in a price reduction equals 
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() () [] () ∏
−
=
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β λ  (A12) 
Thus parameters are estimated by two separate multinomial logits, one for the preceding 
price spell ending in a price reduction and another for the preceding price spell ending 
in a price increase. 
The relation to the Calvo-model is straightforward and needs only the recognition of an 
initial condition. The tossing of a coin is the process that describes whether a price 
signal occurs or not. “Head” means that the price signal occurs and that the price is 
changed. “Tail” means that the old price remains unchanged. The required initial 
condition is that at time 0 the preceding price change took place  0 0 ≠ Y .  
Construction of variables 
Let 
0 , , lt lt lt p p p
− +  be binary variables that denote whether the price of item l is 
higher, lower or the same at time t compared with time  1 − t . Then the frequency 
− +
jt jt f f ,  of a price increase or decrease at time t in category  j  is calculated as 
0
0
lt U l lt U l lt U l
lt U l
jt













∑ + ∑ + ∑
∑
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where  j U  is the sample of all units (elements) belonging to category (set)  j . The 
frequency of a price change  jt f  at time t  in category  j  is calculated as 
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− + + = jt jt jt f f f  (A14) 
 
Calculation of the price increases and decreases of competitors: 
 
Let 
0 , , lt lt lt p p p
− +  be binary variables that denote, for example, whether the price of 
item  l is higher, lower or the same at time t  compared with time  1 − t . Then the 
frequency 
− +
ijt ijt f f ,  of price increases and decreases of firm i ’s competitors at time t  in 
category  j  is calculated as 
0
0
lt U l lt U l lt U l
lt U l
ijt
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j U  is the sample of all units (elements) belonging to category (set)  j  except the 
firm i . From these frequencies the balance is calculated 
− + − = ∆ ijt ijt it f f f . 




































Annex II - Figures and Tables 
Table A1: Number of firms according to the length of their participation 
(including periods of non-participation) 
Length of participation 
(m=months/y= years) 
Number of firms  Percentage share 
1m 169  6.7 
2m to 12m  205  8.1 
1< x <= 2y  163  6.5 
2< x <= 3y  164  6.5 
3< x <= 4y  120  4.8 
4< x <= 5y  115  4.6 
5< x <= 6y  98  3.9 
6< x <= 7y  82  3.3 
7< x <= 8y  69  2.7 
8< x <= 9y  64  2.5 
9< x <=10y  52  2.1 
10< x <=11y  55  2.2 
11< x <=12y  57  2.3 
12< x <=13y  58  2.3 
13< x <=14y  83  3.3 
14< x <=15y  70  2.8 
15< x <=16y  67  2.7 
16< x <=17y  57  2.3 
17< x <=18y  57  2.3 
18< x <=19y  74  2.9 
19< x <=20y  37  1.5 
20< x <=21y  38  1.5 
21< x <=22y  562  22.3 
Total 2  516  100 
 
Table A2: Number of censored and uncensored spells 
Censoring  number of spells  Percentage share 
Complete 24  091  48.5 
left-censored 6  740  13.5 
right-censored 6  740  13.5 
left and right-censored  12 199  24.5 
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Table A3: Number of observed periods according to the length of uninterrupted 
participation 
Length of uninterrupted partici-
pation (m=months/y= years) 
number of 
periods 




1m  16 795  46.1  16 795  4.4 
2m 5  044  13.9  10  088  2.7 
3m  2 635  7.2  7 905  2.1 
4m  2 387  6.6  9 548  2.5 
5m  1 251  3.4  6 255  1.6 
6m 834  2.3  5  004  1.3 
7m 640  1.8  4  480  1.2 
8m 507  1.4  4  056  1.1 
9m 429  1.2  3  861  1.0 
10m 361  1.0  3  610  1.0 
11m 405  1.1  4  455  1.2 
12m 300  0.8  3  600  1.0 
1< x <= 2y  1 713  4.7  30 224  7.9 
2< x <= 3y  827  2.3  25 264  6.6 
3< x <= 4y  494  1.4  20 769  5.5 
4< x <= 5y  300  0.8  16 148  4.2 
5< x <= 10y  763  2.1  63 714  16.7 
10< x <=15y  260  0.7  38 605  10.1 
15< x <=20y  224  0.6  47 248  12.4 
20< x <=22y  229  0.6  58 879  15.5 
Total 36  398  100  380  508  100 
 
Table A4: Planned and actual price changes. 
 Increase  Reduction 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 1981-1990  1991-2000
Share of unexpected price changes  15  17  55  33 
Share of planned price changes that did not happen  42  44  51  36 
Note: A price increase/reduction is unexpected if in none of the preceding three months the question on 
expectations for the change in domestic sales prices (Q. 9) was marked. A price increase/reduction is 
planned and does not happen if Q9 is marked in a certain month but a corresponding price change is not 
reported in Q7 in any of the three following months. Since there are no data for December 2001 and no 
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Table A5: Collective w
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Table A5: Collective w
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Table A6: Sample means, standard deviations and « theories » . 
















Net demand change since the time of the firm’s last price change 
more than 4 reductions   0.0762  0.2653  S  I  sS   
4 reductions  0.0321  0.1763  S  I  sS   
2/3       “  0.1312  0.3376  S  I  sS   
1       “  0.1517  0.3587  S  I  sS   
no change  -  -  -  -  -   
1 increase  0.1420  0.3490  S  I  sS   
2/3       “  0.1109  0.3140  S  I  sS   
4       “  0.0221  0.1472  S  I  sS   
more than 4 increases  0.0419  0.2004  S  I  sS   
Expected demand change during the next six months 
demand decrease expected  0.2055  0.4041  S  I  sS   
no change expected  -  -  -  -  -   
demand increase expected  0.1509  0.3580  S  I  sS   
Demand faced by domestic competitors          
Increasing (contemporaneous)  0.0309  0.0808  S  C     
Decreasing (contemporaneous)  0.0510  0.1075  S  C     
Increasing (preceding month)  0.0296  0.0787  S  C     
Decreasing (preceding month)  0.0511  0.1067  S  C     
Costs 
Cost indices of intermediate inputs; log change of the respective index compared with the time of the firm’s last price change 
Domestic
† 0.0015  0.0078  S    sS   
Imported (increase of)
 † 0.0054  0.0123  S    sS   
Imported (decrease of)
†  0.0145 0.0243  S    sS   
Expected wage increase (log change 
over the next 12 months) 
0.0381 0.0153  S    sS   
Specific month of collective wage bargaining 
formal start of contract  0.0539  0.2258  S  C  A   
month before month of permanent 
wage increase  
(not in mid of long-term contract) 
0.0596 0.2368  S  C  A   
month of permanent wage increase  
(not in mid of long-term contract) 
0.0624 0.2419  S  C  A   
long term contracts only            
mid-term permanent wage increase  0.0231  0.1504  S  C  A   
Relative Prices 
PPI (log change compared to the 
time of t. firm’s last price change) 
0.0119 0.0162  S    sS   
Cumulated price change of domestic competitors since the time of the firm’s last price change until time t-2 (remaining time) 
Increase
†  0.0574 0.2456  S    sS   
Decrease
†  0.0513 0.1908  S    sS   
Prices of domestic competitors           
Increasing (contemporaneous)  0.0269  0.0642  S  C  sS  W 
Decreasing (contemporaneous)  0.0110  0.0377  S  C  sS  W 
Increasing (preceding month)  0.0281 0.0655  S  C  sS  W 
Decreasing (preceding month)  0.0108  0.0375  S  C  sS  W 
Price index of foreign competitors; log change compared with the firm’s last price change 
Price of foreign competitors
†  0.0103 0.0240  S    sS  W 
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Table A6: Sample means, standard deviations and « theories »  













Capacity utilisation / Stocks of finished products / Exports 
log capacity over utilisation  -0.0111  0.1533  S  I     
Technical capacity given actual and expected orders within the next 12 months 
Own firm:            
not sufficient  0.0579  0.2337  S  I     
sufficient -  -  -  -     
more than sufficient  0.2788  0.4484  S  I     
domestic competitors (share):            
not sufficient  0.0112  0.0384  S  C    W 
more than sufficient  0.1837  0.1480  S  C    W 
Stocks of finished products            
too large  0.1490  0.3561  S  I     
sufficient     -  -     
too small  0.0443  0.2059  S  I     
no stocks  0.4271  0.4946  S  I     
Exports            
No exports  0.0255  0.1577  S  -     
History of the firm’s own price setting 
Length of the present price spell and the preceding price spell 
differ by one month  0.0731  0.2603  T       
is the same but not 12 months  0.0232  0.1505  T    (A)   
is the same and 12 months  0.0052  0.0725  T    (A)   
adds to 12 months  0.0323  0.1768  T    (A)   
Preceding spell is missing  0.2055  0.4040  T       
Employees / Industries / etc. 
Employees in product group <= 50  0.1321  0.3386         
Industry (base: nace295)            
nace291 0.1283  0.3344         
nace292 0.0737  0.2614         
nace293 0.0381  0.1914         
nace294 0.0843  0.2779         
nace297 0.0413  0.1991         
nace300 0.0069  0.0828         
nace311 0.0891  0.2850         
nace313 0.0262  0.1597         
nace315 0.0343  0.1821         
nace321 0.0378  0.1907         
nace322 0.0094  0.0969         
Nace323 0.0217  0.1458         
Nace334 0.0298  0.1700         
Nace335 0.0064  0.0800         
Nace341 0.0122  0.1100         
Nace343 0.0417  0.2001         
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Table A6: Sample means, standard deviations and « theories »  













Year (base: 1987) 
          
1980 0.0198  0.1395  S       
1981 0.0509  0.2199  S       
1982 0.0601  0.2378  S       
1983 0.0588  0.2354  S       
1984 0.0590  0.2356  S       
1985 0.0585  0.2348  S       
1986 0.0580  0.2338  S       
1988 0.0562  0.2304  S       
1989 0.0527  0.2236  S       
1990 0.0484  0.2146  S       
1991 0.0482  0.2143  S       
1992 0.0468  0.2113  S       
1993 0.0423  0.2014  S       
1994 0.0407  0.1976  S       
1995 0.0395  0.1948  S       
1996 0.0373  0.1896  S       
1997 0.0352  0.1845  S       
1998 0.0334  0.1797  S       
1999 0.0331  0.1789  S       
2000 0.0324  0.1771  S       
2001 0.0295  0.1693  S       
†  real values, measured relative to the PPI
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Table A7: Means and quartiles of durations for different explanations  
Explanation Year  Quartiles  Mean
   75% 50% 25% 
Calvo 1980-2001  2.3 5.7 11.3  8.6
Conditional time-  1986  2.3 8.3 17  14.1
dependence 1989  3.6 11.3 23.5  16.1
 1992  2.0 6.0 15  11.8
 1995  2.3 8.3 18  13.4
State-dependence 1986 2.3 8 17.5  13.1
 1989  2.3 8 13  10.7
 1992  2 7 27.3  18.2
 1995  2 7 17.5  14.0
Customer anger  1986  2.3 8 16.7  13.3
 1989  3.7 11.3 23  15.7
 1992  2 5.7 14  11.3
 1995  2.3 8 15.5  12.6
Idiosyncratic demand shocks  1986  2 7 15  12.8
 1989  3 11 20  14.5
 1992  2 5 13.3  10.4
 1995  2 7 15.3  12.1
Common shocks  1986  3 7.7 16  11.9
 1989  2.7 8.7 17  13.7
 1992  2 5.5 14.3  11.3
 1995  2.3 8.3 16  12.8
Competition 1986  2.5 7.5 23  14.3
 1989  3 10 22  16.1
 1992  2.3 8.5 30  21.6
 1995  2.3 9 22  15.4
sS-type model  1986  2.3 9 19  13.2
 1989  3 10.7 18  13.7
 1992  2 7 18.7  18.8
 1995  2 8 25  14.0
Domestic competition  1986  2 8 16  13.7
 1989  3 11 21  14.8
 1992  2 5.7 14.7  11.6
 1995  2 8 17  13.2
Foreign competition  1986  2.5 9.7 23  15.2
 1989  4 11.5 24.5  17.4
 1992  2.3 8.3 29  21.6
 1995  2.5 9 21  15.0
Capacity constraints of  1986  2.5 9 19.3  14.2
Domestic competitors  1989  3.7 11.3 23  15.3
 1992  2.3 8 24.7  17.8
 1995  2.5 9 21  14.7
PPI (part of nominal variables  1986  2.3 9 29  13.0
included) 1989  4 11.3 23  15.2
 1992  2.3 8 24.7  17.4
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Table A8: Logit-estimation 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
Demand 
Net demand change since the time of the firm’s last price change (dem)       
more than 4 reductions   0.5253  (0.1336)*** 0.2543 (0.1301)* -0.0533 (0.1918) -0.1455  (0.0584)** 
4 reductions  0.6103  (0.1547)*** 0.3487 (0.1378)** 0.0803 (0.2195) -0.0931  (0.0776) 
2/3       “  0.3850  (0.1099)*** 0.1985 (0.0687)** 0.1535 (0.1307) -0.0004  (0.0447) 
1       “  0.0404  (0.1170)  0.1027 (0.0552)* 0.0872 (0.1230) -0.0305  (0.0391) 
no  change  -  - - - - -  -  - 
1 increase  0.0582  (0.1261)  -0.0157 (0.0682) 0.2977 (0.1222)** 0.0569  (0.0363) 
2/3       “  0.1654  (0.1358)  -0.0990 (0.0869) 0.2823 (0.1240)** 0.0732  (0.0438)* 
4       “  0.2860  (0.2539)  -0.2728 (0.2258) 0.3550 (0.2116)* 0.1494  (0.0783)* 
more than 4 increases  -0.1636  (0.2580)  -0.2433 (0.1787) 0.3350 (0.1665)** 0.1222  (0.0665)* 
Expected demand change during the next six months (demexp)         
demand decrease expected  0.5369  (0.0792)*** 0.2528 (0.0493)*** -0.4448 (0.1079)*** -0.0422 (0.0346) 
no change expected  -  -  - -  - -  -  - 
demand increase expected  0.0770  (0.1096)  -0.0358 (0.0613) 0.0579 (0.0937) 0.1501  (0.0331)***
Demand faced by domestic competitors (demcomp)         
Increasing (contemporaneous)  -0.5746  (0.6193) 0.4641 (0.3013) 1.3042 (0.4603)** 0.4736  (0.1720)** 
Decreasing (contemporaneous)  0.1121  (0.3969)  0.1680 (0.2522) 0.7231 (0.4961) 0.1279  (0.1625) 
Increasing (preceding month)  -0.6307  (0.6165) -0.9513 (0.3288)**  0.0353 (0.4782) 0.1349  (0.1769) 
Decreasing (preceding month)  0.1701  (0.4188) 0.2141 (0.2587) 0.0182 (0.5248) 0.4051  (0.1677)** 
Cost 
Cost indices of intermediate inputs; log change of the respective index compared with the time of the firm’s last price change (cost) 
Domestic 2.0811  (6.1431)  4.2443 (5.8017) 6.4821 (7.6619)  2.3764  (2.7110) 
Imported (increase of)  -8.2458  (5.2850)  -6.1631 (3.2592)* 5.6001 (3.3098)* 0.3209  (1.4502) 
Imported (decrease of)  3.0583  (2.4657)  0.6416 (2.5137) -2.0967 (2.9878) -1.0795  (0.9751) 
Expected wage increase (log  
change over the next 12 months) 
-3.4510 (3.2125)  -2.8589 (1.8482) 5.9073 (3.1325)*  0.4100  (1.1798) 
Specific month of collective wage bargaining (wagebarg)        
formal start of contract  -0.2053  (0.1584)  -0.1331 (0.0939) 0.4082 (0.1272)** 0.1832  (0.0435)***
month before month of permanent 
wage increase  
(not in mid of long-term contract) 
-0.2053 (0.1681)  0.0797 (0.0939)  0.2803 (0.1519)* 0.2721  (0.0501)***
month of permanent wage increase 
(not in mid of long-term contract) 
-0.2471 (0.1683)  -0.0375 (0.0979)  0.2195 (0.1515) 0.3624  (0.0519)***
long-term contracts only (longterm)         
mid-term permanent wage increase 0.0015  (0.2420) 0.0048 (0.1438) 0.4334 (0.2058)** 0.6502  (0.0685)***
Relative prices 
PPI (log change compared to the 
time of t. firm’s last price change) 
-2.4217 (4.6375)  -0.2670 (4.2544)  13.3561 (5.1562)** 7.2563  (1.8267)***
Prices of domestic competitors (pricedomcomp1)         
increasing (contemporaneous)  -0.2561  (0.8098)  -0.2016 (0.5903) 2.3005 (0.5880)*** 2.0999  (0.1710)***
decreasing (contemporaneous)  1.4186  (0.9454)  1.8383 (0.4432)*** -4.9512 (1.7088)** -1.9452  (0.7219)** 
increasing (preceding month)  -0.7278 (0.8241)  -1.0322 (0.6590) 0.8819 (0.7065) -0.2330  (0.2343) 
decreasing (preceding month)  -1.1757  (1.0644) -0.4955 (0.5211)  1.1277 (1.3517) 0.6011  (0.6598) 
Cumulated price change of domestic competitors since the time of the firm’s 
last price change until time t-2 (remaining time) (pricedomcomp2) 
Increase 0.2269  (0.1483)  -0.1315 (0.2576) -0.0976 (0.2230)  -0.0467  (0.0598) 
Decrease -0.0600  (0.1630)  0.1049 (0.1387) 0.1506 (0.1747)  -0.2184  (0.1363) 
Price indices of  foreign competitors; log change compared to the firm’s last price change (priceforcomp) 
Price of foreign competitors  1.0524  (2.3580)  -0.6486 (2.0257) -6.7381 (2.5524)** -0.7569  (0.9162) 
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Table A8: Logit-estimation 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
Capacity utilisation / Stocks of finished products / Exports 
log capacity over utilisation (cap)  -0.2133  (0.2274) -0.0525 (0.1253)  0.1728 (0.2332) 0.3664  (0.0933)***
Technical capacity given actual and expected orders within the next 12 months 
Own firm: (capexpown)           
not sufficient  -0.2160  (0.1960)  0.1831 (0.1084)* 0.0938 (0.1629) 0.2029  (0.0466)***
sufficient  -  - - - - -  -  - 
more than sufficient  0.1141  (0.0790)  0.1084 (0.0465)** 0.0943 (0.0879) 0.0193  (0.0318) 
Domestic competitors (share): (capexpcomp)        
not sufficient  0.0653  (1.1414)  -1.4580 (0.8638)* -2.3820 (1.2549)* 0.8327  (0.3207)** 
more than sufficient  0.5034  (0.3061)  0.1128 (0.1825) -0.6488 (0.3602)* -0.3608  (0.1221)** 
Stocks of finished products (stocks)         
too large  0.3701  (0.0922)*** 0.0698 (0.0573) 0.0508 (0.1044) 0.0210  (0.0389) 
Sufficient  -  - - - - -  -  - 
too small  -0.2375  (0.2249)  -0.1863 (0.1328) 0.3899 (0.1668)** 0.1539  (0.0518)** 
no stocks  0.0016  (0.0868)  -0.0081 (0.0543) -0.2298 (0.0940)**  -0.0398  (0.0295) 
Exports (export)           
No exports  0.4296  (0.1781)**  0.1315 (0.0974) -0.1729 (0.1887)  -0.0043  (0.0810) 
History of the firm’s own price setting 
Length of the present price spell and the preceding price spell (history)      
differ by one month  0.1328  (0.1372)  0.3440 (0.0642)*** 0.2513 (0.1351)* 0.3473  (0.0453)***
is the same but not 12 months  0.3798  (0.1950)* 0.2185 (0.0948)**  0.3735 (0.1797)** 0.2936  (0.0782)***
is the same and 12 months  1.0719  (0.3702)**  1.0873 (0.6681) 2.2934 (0.6188)*** 1.3575  (0.0849)***
adds to 12 months  0.5203  (0.1735)**  0.0777 (0.1221) 0.9445 (0.1462)*** 0.7575  (0.0448)***
Preceding spell is missing  -0.0949  (0.0938)  -0.0145 (0.0593) 0.0124 (0.1056) -0.0528  (0.0314)* 
Employees/Industries / etc. 
Employees in product group <=50  -0.2593  (0.1082)**  -0.0445 (0.0633) -0.0605 (0.1141) 0.0006  (0.0355) 
Industry (base: nace295)           
nace291 0.0314  (0.1148)  0.0932 (0.0774) 0.3507 (0.1256)**  0.1877  (0.0381)***
nace292 0.5490  (0.1243)*** 0.0737 (0.0794) 0.1361 (0.1347)  0.0953  (0.0490)* 
nace293 -0.2948  (0.1999)  0.0168 (0.1737) 0.6211 (0.2203)**  0.3908  (0.0597)***
nace294 -0.2948  (0.1416)**  -0.1320 (0.0963) 0.3037 (0.1498)**  -0.0750  (0.0464) 
nace297 0.0606  (0.1809)  -0.1359 (0.1408) 0.0443 (0.1875)  0.1238  (0.0634)* 
nace300 1.5244  (0.3496)*** 0.3497 (0.1522)** -1.1885 (0.3650)**  -0.7528  (0.2977)** 
nace311 0.3955  (0.1246)**  0.1440 (0.0734)* -0.0562 (0.1368)  0.1551  (0.0467)** 
nace313 1.3991  (0.1617)*** 0.4264 (0.1006)*** 0.5256 (0.1738)** 0.2096  (0.0848)** 
nace315 -0.0744  (0.2147)  0.2598 (0.1364)* 0.1839 (0.2333) 0.1159  (0.0661)* 
nace321 0.6334  (0.1826)**  0.5104 (0.0896)*** -0.6730 (0.2104)** 0.0959  (0.0730) 
nace322 0.5083  (0.3924)  0.3269 (0.1427)**  -1.8447 (0.5920)** -0.1666  (0.1606) 
nace323 1.4799  (0.2006)*** 0.2701 (0.1090)**  -0.9775 (0.2166)*** -0.2914 (0.1289)** 
nace334 -0.7614  (0.2787)**  -0.3501 (0.1914)* -0.4188 (0.3227) -0.0019  (0.0758) 
nace335 0.0476  (0.4656)  -0.1088 (0.2391) -0.3619 (0.4125)  -0.0717  (0.1882) 
nace341 -0.7432  (0.4591)  -1.5335 (1.0178) 0.1573 (0.6206)  0.5689  (0.0876)***
nace343 0.5979  (0.1647)*** 0.4106 (0.0899)*** -0.3022 (0.1980) 0.1300  (0.0647)** 
nace35 0.2085  (0.3914)  -0.2827 (0.3771) 0.2455 (0.4855)  0.3542  (0.1424)** 
Month           
January -0.0562  (0.1606)  0.1723 (0.0926)* 0.4799 (0.1345)***  0.5281  (0.0454)***
February  -  - - - - -  -  - 
March -0.1620  (0.2009)  0.0348 (0.1172) -0.1513 (0.1992) 0.0005  (0.0598) 
April -0.0122  (0.1694)  0.0527 (0.1003) 0.1801 (0.1534)  -0.0306  (0.0499) 
May -0.1113  (0.1603)  -0.0647 (0.0951)  -0.1975 (0.1623) -0.3399  (0.0534)***
June -0.0008  (0.1902)  0.2152 (0.1139)*  -0.0950 (0.2187) -0.5685  (0.0774)***
July -0.2033  (0.1574)  -0.1840 (0.0939)* -0.4374 (0.1754)**  -0.5835  (0.0622)***
August -0.0811  (0.1540)  -0.1261 (0.0929)  -0.8816 (0.2069)*** -0.7721 (0.0694)***
September -0.1571  (0.1968)  -0.0924 (0.1167) -0.5621 (0.2512)**  -0.6042  (0.0895)***
October -0.1002  (0.1558)  -0.0356 (0.0915) -0.5491 (0.1785)**  -0.2663  (0.0584)***
November -0.1904  (0.1563)  -0.1177 (0.0919) -0.5749 (0.1757)**  -0.5301  (0.0599)***
December -0.5977  (0.2321)**  -0.2892 (0.1217)** -0.5523 (0.2379)**  -0.4691  (0.0775)***
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Table A8: Logit-estimation 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
Year (base: 1987)           
1980 -0.5510  (0.3973)  -0.0956 (0.2313) 0.6384 (0.3470)*  0.1495  (0.1012) 
1981 -0.0869  (0.2636)  -0.0886 (0.1780) 0.7204 (0.2596)**  0.2993  (0.0832)***
1982 -0.1188  (0.2329)  -0.0733 (0.1519) 0.4940 (0.2455)**  -0.0146  (0.0813) 
1983 0.3264  (0.2209)  -0.1169 (0.1430)  -0.3600 (0.2395) -0.0051  (0.0773) 
1984 0.0575  (0.2412)  -0.1322 (0.1510)  -0.2212 (0.2341) 0.0728  (0.0778) 
1985 -0.4252  (0.2557)*  -0.1627 (0.1706) 0.0943 (0.2403)  0.1022  (0.0765) 
1986 0.0055  (0.2145)  -0.1927 (0.1769)  -0.0310 (0.2595) 0.0893  (0.0741) 
1988 -0.1176  (0.2552)  -0.2208 (0.1567) -0.5019 (0.2428)**  0.1464  (0.0779)* 
1989 -0.1860  (0.2784)  -0.4065 (0.2103)* -0.2592 (0.2578)  0.1293  (0.0797) 
1990 -0.5922  (0.3154)*  -0.0588 (0.2089) -0.2282 (0.2936) 0.2120  (0.0802)** 
1991 0.0534  (0.2471)  0.3509 (0.1657)**  -0.1664 (0.3020) 0.1609  (0.0818)** 
1992 0.6573  (0.2091)**  0.2003 (0.1405)  -0.3046 (0.2765) 0.1295  (0.0810) 
1993 0.9802  (0.2125)*** 0.2143 (0.1325)  -1.3741 (0.3229)*** -0.3167 (0.1024)** 
1994 0.3664  (0.2678)  0.0512 (0.1303)  -0.8763 (0.2351)*** -0.4481 (0.1132)***
1995 0.1401  (0.2778)  0.1830 (0.1398)  -0.2430 (0.2241) 0.3359  (0.0898)***
1996 0.7748  (0.2179)*** -0.0038 (0.1355)  -0.7773 (0.2782)** -0.2445  (0.1039)** 
1997 0.4198  (0.2709)  -0.0563 (0.1456)  -0.7410 (0.2692)** -0.0952  (0.1126) 
1998 0.0872  (0.2794)  0.0549 (0.1402)  -1.2256 (0.2978)*** -0.1912 (0.1079)* 
1999 0.3738  (0.2625)  0.0501 (0.1385)  -0.6668 (0.2707)** -0.3100  (0.1157)** 
2000 0.2308  (0.3527)  0.0519 (0.1714)  -0.5864 (0.2727)** 0.0341  (0.1067) 
2001 -0.1007  (0.2829)  -0.1854 (0.1671)  -0.6731 (0.3103)** -0.0097  (0.1055) 
dummies for the baseline hazard           
tt2 0.8454  (0.2457)**  0.0338 (0.0692)  0.2237 (0.2026) -0.8695  (0.0522)***
tt3 0.9917  (0.2389)*** -0.1967 (0.0745)**  0.7036 (0.1898)*** -1.3634 (0.0612)***
tt4 1.0863  (0.2400)*** -0.5665 (0.0888)*** 0.6855 (0.1998)** -1.5021  (0.0732)***
tt5 1.0650  (0.2486)*** -0.7605 (0.1034)*** 0.7961 (0.2034)*** -1.2757 (0.0755)***
tt6 0.8134  (0.2549)**  -0.7591 (0.1148)*** 0.9223 (0.2114)*** -1.3194 (0.0748)***
tt7 1.0961  (0.2515)*** -0.9694 (0.1301)*** 0.9854 (0.2170)*** -1.4451 (0.0827)***
tt8 0.8708  (0.2692)**  -1.4393 (0.1662)*** 0.6755 (0.2417)** -1.1576  (0.0798)***
tt9 0.7014  (0.2727)**  -0.8119 (0.1455)*** 0.9257 (0.2409)*** -1.0070 (0.0730)***
tt10 0.6086  (0.2828)**  -1.0682 (0.1664)*** 0.5322 (0.2686)** -0.6087  (0.0704)***
tt11 0.8118  (0.2916)**  -1.0665 (0.1788)*** 0.4492 (0.2764) -0.1052  (0.0699) 
tt12 0.9222  (0.3060)**  -0.9559 (0.1862)*** 0.6066 (0.2855)** 0.6401  (0.0700)***
tt13 1.2366  (0.2987)*** -1.3498 (0.2264)*** 0.3345 (0.3232) 0.1334  (0.0821) 
tt14 0.9643  (0.3387)**  -1.7802 (0.2765)*** 0.6844 (0.3042)** -0.3029  (0.1028)** 
tt15 0.5905  (0.3683)  -2.0715 (0.3263)*** 0.7272 (0.3155)** -0.6732  (0.1150)***
tt16 0.7835  (0.3589)**  -1.8451 (0.3163)*** 0.4410 (0.3471) -1.4264  (0.1666)***
tt17 0.8118  (0.3749)**  -1.3648 (0.2656)*** 0.5952 (0.3471)* -1.6493  (0.1992)***
tt18 0.7581  (0.3777)**  -2.1602 (0.3803)*** 0.3052 (0.3992) -1.4722  (0.1773)***
tt19 0.8055  (0.3810)**  -2.1320 (0.4043)*** 0.5282 (0.3809) -1.4957  (0.1862)***
tt20 0.4067  (0.4682)  -1.7831 (0.3500)*** 0.3449 (0.4043) -1.4917  (0.1969)***
tt21 1.0531  (0.3814)**  -1.6382 (0.3378)*** 0.2258 (0.4363) -1.2528  (0.1618)***
tt22 1.2229  (0.3751)**  -1.8003 (0.3867)*** 0.6725 (0.4016)* -1.3911  (0.1789)***
tt23 0.6137  (0.4775)  -2.5060 (0.5246)*** 0.8051 (0.3918)** -0.7784  (0.1578)***
tt24 1.6046  (0.3730)*** -1.5557 (0.3734)*** 1.0707 (0.3889)** 0.0230  (0.1246) 
tt25 1.1499  (0.4254)**  -2.2903 (0.5273)*** -0.2215 (0.5745) -0.5890  (0.1611)***
tt26 1.0971  (0.4673)**  -2.2872 (0.5282)*** -0.1248 (0.5744) -0.8779  (0.1975)***
tt27 0.7164  (0.5125)  -2.1852 (0.5311)*** -0.0520 (0.5820) -1.5296  (0.2417)***
tt28 -  -  -3.5716 (1.0165)*** -0.2899 (0.6496) -1.6841  (0.2967)***
tt29 1.3584  (0.4630)**  -2.1696 (0.5325)*** -0.2115 (0.6532) -1.5707  (0.3084)***
tt30 0.1760  (0.6625)  -3.4063 (1.0177)**  0.9464 (0.4664)** -1.4987  (0.2806)***
tt31 -  -  -3.4141 (1.0186)**  -0.2715 (0.7716) -1.6669  (0.3101)***
tt32 0.3586  (0.6673)  -1.8263 (0.4889)*** -0.2552 (0.7722) -1.8414  (0.3532)***
tt33 0.8305  (0.5621)  -2.5900 (0.7360)*** -0.8226 (1.0473) -1.9833  (0.3238)***
tt34 0.3244  (0.6739)  -1.6064 (0.4946)**  0.2861 (0.6614) -1.6533  (0.3025)***
tt35 0.5974  (0.6792)  -2.5516 (0.7388)** 0.9221 (0.5214)*  -0.6924  (0.2227)** 
tt36 0.1687  (0.7939)  -1.3375 (0.4667)**  0.6244 (0.6035) -0.7454  (0.2105)***
Number of observations    118 945 118 945 118 945    118 945
Pseudo R-squared    0.1447 0.1447 0.1447   0.1447
Log-Likelihood    -31 911 -31 911 -31 911    -31 911
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
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Table A9: Logit-estimation: time-dependent variables only 
Explanatory variables  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
Constant -5.7170  (0.1725)*** -1.6989 (0.0775)*** -4.0907 (0.1730)*** -1.7745  (0.0385)***
dummies for the baseline hazard           
tt2 0.7189  (0.1726)*** 0.1655 (0.0518)**  0.4965 (0.1794)** -0.8468  (0.0427)***
tt3 0.8204  (0.1740)*** -0.1479 (0.0599)**  0.9643 (0.1722)*** -1.2904  (0.0527)***
tt4 0.9307  (0.1739)*** -0.5873 (0.0730)*** 0.9789 (0.1783)*** -1.4869  (0.0638)***
tt5 0.8680  (0.1787)*** -0.8075 (0.0839)*** 1.1748 (0.1773)*** -1.2870  (0.0628)***
tt6 0.7891  (0.1862)*** -0.8576 (0.0916)*** 1.2197 (0.1821)*** -1.2475  (0.0625)***
tt7 1.0756  (0.1791)*** -1.0509 (0.1053)*** 1.3738 (0.1821)*** -1.2866  (0.0661)***
tt8 0.7475  (0.1957)*** -1.5124 (0.1349)*** 1.1044 (0.1988)*** -1.1668  (0.0627)***
tt9 0.8180  (0.1962)*** -0.9579 (0.1138)*** 1.2656 (0.1982)*** -1.0133  (0.0562)***
tt10 0.8233  (0.2011)*** -1.2546 (0.1358)*** 0.8942 (0.2247)*** -0.5605  (0.0503)***
tt11 0.8808  (0.2102)*** -1.2157 (0.1413)*** 1.1959 (0.2129)*** 0.0099  (0.0444) 
tt12 1.4723  (0.2016)*** -1.0067 (0.1368)*** 1.1031 (0.2256)*** 1.0372  (0.0389)***
tt13 1.3421  (0.2182)*** -1.5539 (0.1843)*** 0.8498 (0.2534)** 0.0992  (0.0566)* 
tt14 1.4360  (0.2211)*** -1.8836 (0.2246)*** 0.9820 (0.2502)*** -0.4192  (0.0756)***
tt15 1.0333  (0.2611)*** -2.2116 (0.2727)*** 1.1066 (0.2473)*** -0.7597  (0.0921)***
tt16 1.0864  (0.2614)*** -2.1404 (0.2729)*** 0.8679 (0.2773)** -1.4366  (0.1395)***
tt17 0.9658  (0.2770)*** -1.5490 (0.2161)*** 1.1102 (0.2674)*** -1.5903  (0.1570)***
tt18 1.0137  (0.2833)*** -2.1277 (0.2944)*** 0.6839 (0.3242)** -1.5156  (0.1509)***
tt19 1.1262  (0.2775)*** -2.1445 (0.3073)*** 0.8810 (0.3056)** -1.5882  (0.1629)***
tt20 0.8947  (0.3138)**  -1.9848 (0.2950)*** 0.9438 (0.3059)** -1.6214  (0.1650)***
tt21 1.2252  (0.2835)*** -1.8260 (0.2842)*** 0.7957 (0.3367)** -1.3389  (0.1344)***
tt22 1.3632  (0.2769)*** -1.8258 (0.2956)*** 1.0444 (0.3156)** -1.4107  (0.1484)***
tt23 0.8021  (0.3636)**  -2.6380 (0.4519)*** 1.1430 (0.3072)*** -0.8054  (0.1154)***
tt24 1.8105  (0.2623)*** -1.7425 (0.3090)*** 1.4124 (0.2929)*** -0.0056  (0.0863) 
tt25 1.4406  (0.3127)*** -2.4873 (0.4525)*** 0.4433 (0.4364) -0.6637  (0.1291)***
tt26 1.4416  (0.3236)*** -2.6518 (0.5049)*** 0.6518 (0.4087) -0.8398  (0.1490)***
tt27 0.8053  (0.4340)*  -2.1824 (0.4145)*** 0.4260 (0.4735) -1.4890  (0.2099)***
tt28 -0.2616  (0.7225)  -2.8397 (0.5819)*** -0.0910 (0.5982) -1.5807  (0.2475)***
tt29 1.2790  (0.3655)*** -2.4882 (0.5055)*** 0.5373 (0.4742) -1.7617  (0.2820)***
tt30 0.5488  (0.5223)  -2.6966 (0.5824)*** 1.3648 (0.3537)*** -1.5675  (0.2556)***
tt31 0.5826  (0.5223)  -3.7512 (1.0030)*** 0.1703 (0.5991) -1.7917  (0.2937)***
tt32 0.3572  (0.5969)  -2.0780 (0.4543)*** 0.2399 (0.5994) -1.9435  (0.3065)***
tt33 1.2486  (0.4072)**  -2.9685 (0.7117)*** -0.8044 (1.0131) -1.9533  (0.2830)***
tt34 0.4681  (0.5966)  -1.6383 (0.3870)*** 0.3098 (0.6004) -1.7594  (0.2731)***
tt35 1.2838  (0.4352)**  -2.4106 (0.5837)*** 1.0708 (0.4408)** -0.8885  (0.1834)***
tt36 0.2496  (0.7231)  -1.6322 (0.4179)*** 1.1444 (0.4413)** -0.7717  (0.1729)***
Month           
January -0.0873  (0.1508)  0.1697 (0.0858)** 0.5011 (0.1212)***  0.6422  (0.0408)***
February           
March -0.0805  (0.1476)  0.0127 (0.0884) -0.0725 (0.1376) 0.0392  (0.0426) 
April -0.0815  (0.1475)  0.0391 (0.0882) 0.3324 (0.1265)**  0.2867  (0.0413)***
May -0.1687  (0.1481)  -0.0290 (0.0893)  -0.3157 (0.1472)** -0.2843  (0.0466)***
June 0.1271  (0.1394)  0.1679 (0.0860)*  -0.5218 (0.1567)** -0.6150  (0.0543)***
July -0.1415  (0.1480)  -0.1405 (0.0899)  -0.7464 (0.1657)*** -0.6765  (0.0582)***
August -0.0173  (0.1438)  -0.0703 (0.0886)  -1.2588 (0.1981)*** -0.9174  (0.0660)***
September -0.0303  (0.1459)  -0.0012 (0.0872) -0.9856 (0.1777)*** -0.8050  (0.0642)***
October -0.0173  (0.1459)  0.0083 (0.0872)  -0.8310 (0.1684)*** -0.3091  (0.0540)***
November -0.1287  (0.1468)  -0.0601 (0.0874) -0.8293 (0.1656)***  -0.6411  (0.0566)***
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Table A9: Logit-estimation: time-dependent variables only 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
Industry (base: nace295)           
nace291 0.1465  (0.0987)  0.0753 (0.0687) 0.3222 (0.1093)**  0.2200  (0.0332)***
nace292 0.5164  (0.1099)*** 0.0335 (0.0719) 0.0923 (0.1198)  0.1055  (0.0443)** 
nace293 -0.0755  (0.1685)  -0.1216 (0.1564) 0.8625 (0.1854)***  0.3501  (0.0501)***
nace294 -0.1894  (0.1282)  -0.0285 (0.0858) 0.1544 (0.1358)  -0.0461  (0.0416) 
nace297 0.3286  (0.1436)**  -0.1970 (0.1160)* 0.3988 (0.1503)**  0.2338  (0.0523)***
nace300 1.4254  (0.2877)*** 0.1977 (0.1214) -0.7442 (0.3255)**  -0.7017  (0.2583)** 
nace311 0.4105  (0.1075)*** 0.1684 (0.0635)** -0.1766 (0.1197)  0.1771  (0.0408)***
nace313 1.2552  (0.1308)*** 0.4719 (0.0801)*** 0.5416 (0.1414)*** 0.3284  (0.0695)***
nace315 -0.1286  (0.1863)  0.1775 (0.1133) 0.2798 (0.1952)  0.1578  (0.0560)** 
nace321 0.6104  (0.1483)*** 0.4053 (0.0686)*** -0.3463 (0.1671)** 0.1576  (0.0624)** 
nace322 0.2952  (0.3400)  0.3370 (0.1183)**  -1.6495 (0.5061)** -0.1314  (0.1440) 
nace323 1.2787  (0.1649)*** 0.1104 (0.0859) -0.5257 (0.1823)**  -0.1499  (0.1088) 
nace334 -0.5245  (0.2312)**  -0.4327 (0.1734)** -0.3738 (0.2883)  -0.0772  (0.0652) 
nace335 0.2489  (0.3843)  -0.1791 (0.2103) -0.2117 (0.3451) 0.0181  (0.1546) 
nace341 -1.0140  (0.4515)**  -1.8841 (1.0101)* 0.6183 (0.4684) 0.6565  (0.0747)***
nace343 0.5665  (0.1398)*** 0.2338 (0.0762)** -0.3387 (0.1705)** 0.2549  (0.0554)***
nace35 0.4  (0.2849)  -0.5605 (0.2289)** -0.5432 (0.3432)  0.3854  (0.1061)***
Number of observations    147 752 40 886 40 886    147 752
Pseudo R-squared    0.1095 0.0814 0.0814   0.1095
Log-Likelihood    -40 496.0 -15 727.1 -15 727.1    -40 496.0
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table A10: Logit-estimation: time-dependent variables and PPI 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction reduction increase  increase  increase 
PPI (log change compared with 
the time of t. firm’s last price 
change) 
-9.3590 (2.1577)*** 31.0623 (2.5733)*** -15.0127 (2.6241)*** 11.2602 (0.7847)***
Constant -5.6957  (0.1725)*** -4.1833 (0.1739)*** -1.6777 (0.0776)*** -1.8056 (0.0386)***
dummies for the baseline hazard           
tt2 0.7355  (0.1727)*** 0.4629 (0.1795)**  0.1795 (0.0519)** -0.8686  (0.0427)***
tt3 0.8518  (0.1742)*** 0.8908 (0.1723)*** -0.1182 (0.0601)** -1.3305  (0.0527)***
tt4 0.9748  (0.1741)*** 0.8593 (0.1787)*** -0.5410 (0.0735)*** -1.5442 (0.0639)***
tt5 0.9250  (0.1791)*** 1.0048 (0.1781)*** -0.7438 (0.0845)*** -1.3608 (0.0630)***
tt6 0.8579  (0.1867)*** 1.0098 (0.1833)*** -0.7787 (0.0926)*** -1.3361 (0.0628)***
tt7 1.1553  (0.1799)*** 1.1243 (0.1838)*** -0.9583 (0.1064)*** -1.3909 (0.0666)***
tt8 0.8371  (0.1966)*** 0.8225 (0.2008)*** -1.4063 (0.1360)*** -1.2864 (0.0634)***
tt9 0.9166  (0.1973)*** 0.9607 (0.2006)*** -0.8405 (0.1154)*** -1.1444 (0.0570)***
tt10 0.9288  (0.2023)*** 0.5464 (0.2277)**  -1.1240 (0.1374)*** -0.7078 (0.0516)***
tt11 0.9929  (0.2115)*** 0.8111 (0.2166)*** -1.0734 (0.1432)*** -0.1497 (0.0460)** 
tt12 1.5865  (0.2031)*** 0.6757 (0.2299)**  -0.8496 (0.1392)*** 0.8755  (0.0406)***
tt13 1.4623  (0.2197)*** 0.3866 (0.2581)  -1.3869 (0.1863)*** -0.0745 (0.0582) 
tt14 1.5604  (0.2227)*** 0.5011 (0.2550)**  -1.7069 (0.2264)*** -0.6002 (0.0769)***
tt15 1.1637  (0.2626)*** 0.5749 (0.2533)**  -2.0219 (0.2744)*** -0.9493 (0.0934)***
tt16 1.2235  (0.2630)*** 0.2949 (0.2834)  -1.9415 (0.2748)*** -1.6401 (0.1405)***
tt17 1.1105  (0.2787)*** 0.5172 (0.2741)*  -1.3375 (0.2188)*** -1.8026 (0.1579)***
tt18 1.1659  (0.2850)*** 0.0509 (0.3309)  -1.9017 (0.2967)*** -1.7358 (0.1519)***
tt19 1.2897  (0.2796)*** 0.2338 (0.3127)  -1.9114 (0.3096)*** -1.8256 (0.1641)***
tt20 1.0701  (0.3159)**  0.2786 (0.3136)  -1.7435 (0.2976)*** -1.8756 (0.1663)***
tt21 1.4092  (0.2861)*** 0.1108 (0.3442)  -1.5739 (0.2872)*** -1.6035 (0.1361)***
tt22 1.5518  (0.2797)*** 0.3119 (0.3259)  -1.5606 (0.2987)*** -1.6892 (0.1502)***
tt23 0.9959  (0.3658)**  0.4 (0.3173)  -2.3716 (0.4540)*** -1.1005 (0.1180)***
tt24 2.0058  (0.2654)*** 0.6410 (0.3043)**  -1.4683 (0.3123)*** -0.2982 (0.0895)** 
tt25 1.6519  (0.3158)*** -0.3789 (0.4466)  -2.2042 (0.4548)*** -0.9800 (0.1319)***
tt26 1.6610  (0.3269)*** -0.1661 (0.4185)  -2.3567 (0.5072)*** -1.1718 (0.1517)***
tt27 1.0357  (0.4366)**  -0.4042 (0.4823)  -1.8842 (0.4174)*** -1.8269 (0.2119)***
tt28 -0.0202  (0.7242)  -0.9270 (0.6054)  -2.5349 (0.5841)*** -1.9176 (0.2491)***
tt29 1.5277  (0.3691)*** -0.3281 (0.4841)  -2.1717 (0.5081)*** -2.1020 (0.2834)***
tt30 0.8083  (0.5250)  0.5180 (0.3655)  -2.3826 (0.5847)*** -1.9154 (0.2572)***
tt31 0.8481  (0.5253)  -0.6769 (0.6070)  -3.4336 (1.0044)** -2.1453  (0.2951)***
tt32  0.6348  (0.5997) -0.6415 (0.6079) -1.7524 (0.4575)*** -2.3222 (0.3083)***
tt33 1.5303  (0.4115)*** -1.7062 (1.0188)*  -2.6374 (0.7138)*** -2.3255 (0.2847)***
tt34 0.7583  (0.5997)  -0.7047 (0.6219)  -1.3002 (0.3911)** -2.1559  (0.2751)***
tt35 1.5790  (0.4396)*** 0.0888 (0.4601)  -2.0786 (0.5864)*** -1.3166 (0.1874)***
tt36 0.5497  (0.7260)  0.1006 (0.4624)  -1.2833 (0.4219)** -1.1974  (0.1765)***
Month           
January -0.0861  (0.1509)  0.5058 (0.1217)*** 0.1746 (0.0859)** 0.6404  (0.0409)***
February  -  - - - - -  -  - 
March -0.0853  (0.1476)  -0.0652 (0.1382) 0.0065 (0.0885)  0.0458  (0.0426) 
April -0.0899  (0.1475)  0.3575 (0.1271)** 0.0296 (0.0883)  0.2995  (0.0414)***
May -0.1748  (0.1481)  -0.2823 (0.1477)*  -0.0388 (0.0894) -0.2734  (0.0466)***
June 0.1220  (0.1393)  -0.4907 (0.1572)** 0.1598 (0.0861)*  -0.6036  (0.0544)***
July -0.1446  (0.1479)  -0.7194 (0.1661)*** -0.1457 (0.0899) -0.6668  (0.0583)***
August -0.0110  (0.1438)  -1.2457 (0.1984)*** -0.0715 (0.0887) -0.9185  (0.0660)***
September -0.0221  (0.1458)  -0.9711 (0.1781)*** -0.0017 (0.0873) -0.8085  (0.0643)***
October -0.0090  (0.1459)  -0.8108 (0.1688)*** 0.0080 (0.0873) -0.3116  (0.0541)***
November -0.1286  (0.1467)  -0.8075 (0.1660)*** -0.0604 (0.0875) -0.6377  (0.0567)***
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Table A10: Logit-estimation: time-dependent variables and PPI 
Explanatory variable  increase  reduction  reduction reduction  reduction increase  increase increase 
Industry (base: nace295)             
nace291 0.1339  (0.0988)  0.4278 (0.1105)*** 0.0603 (0.0687) 0.2321  (0.0332)***
nace292 0.5080  (0.1099)*** 0.1016 (0.1204) 0.0369 (0.0720)  0.1138  (0.0444)** 
nace293 -0.0941  (0.1686)  0.9187 (0.1861)*** -0.1201 (0.1563) 0.3770  (0.0502)***
nace294 -0.1868  (0.1282)  0.2150 (0.1366) -0.0371 (0.0858)  -0.0540  (0.0416) 
nace297 0.3157  (0.1437)**  0.4533 (0.1511)**  -0.1958 (0.1160)* 0.2472  (0.0523)***
nace300 1.4363  (0.2878)*** -0.8966 (0.3282)** 0.2079 (0.1216)*  -0.6918  (0.2581)** 
nace311 0.4116  (0.1075)*** -0.0872 (0.1207) 0.1615 (0.0635)**  0.1759  (0.0409)***
nace313 1.2759  (0.1309)*** 0.6085 (0.1423)*** 0.4655 (0.0801)*** 0.3094  (0.0696)***
nace315 -0.1471  (0.1863)  0.3762 (0.1961)* 0.1616 (0.1133) 0.1792  (0.0560)** 
nace321 0.5984  (0.1483)*** -0.3304 (0.1675)** 0.4058 (0.0686)***  0.1762  (0.0625)** 
nace322 0.3351  (0.3401)  -1.6147 (0.5065)** 0.3249 (0.1183)**  -0.1874  (0.1448) 
nace323 1.2973  (0.1650)*** -0.5700 (0.1827)** 0.1244 (0.0860) -0.1904  (0.1092)* 
nace334 -0.5299  (0.2312)**  -0.2831 (0.2891) -0.4422 (0.1734)**  -0.0738  (0.0653) 
nace335 0.2485  (0.3843)  -0.1459 (0.3463) -0.1825 (0.2103) 0.0214  (0.1549) 
nace341 -1.0334  (0.4515)**  0.6854 (0.4697) -1.8860 (1.0103)*  0.6767  (0.0748)***
nace343 0.5715  (0.1399)*** -0.3012 (0.1710)* 0.2282 (0.0763)**  0.2489  (0.0555)***
nace35 0.4377  (0.2850)  -0.5683 (0.3440)* -0.5537 (0.2290)**  0.3292  (0.1065)** 
Number of observations    147 752 40 886 40 886    147 752
Pseudo R-squared    0.1120 0.0865 0.0865   0.1120
Log-Likelihood   -40  384.1 -15 639.7 -15 639.7    -40 384.1
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Rem:     Each month the shares of increased, reduced and unchanged prices sum up to 100%.
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- price reductions following price reductions -
Source: Ifo business survey, Munich; own estimation
Rem:     Sequences of more than two consecutive price changes have been omitted
.
Unconditional transition intensities and estimated
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Annex III – Questionnaire ifo business cycle survey 
 
Ifo Institute  
for Economic Research 
Ifo Business Survey 
Manufacturing  
The questions refer to the product printed below (in the following named XY). Please mark the 
appropriate box. 




January 2002      Please see also the reverse 
 
Product (XY): 
Present situation and trends 
 





(2)  Our domestic production activity




No significant domestic production. 
 
(3)  We consider our present stock of unsold finished products of XY as being 
too small 
satisfactory (usual seasonal stock) 
too large. 
Stockpiling not customary. 
 





(5)  Our orders on hand (domestic and foreign, in terms of value) for XY have compared to the past 
month 
increased 





                                                 
 Disregarding differing number of days per month and seasonal fluctuations.  
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(6)  We consider our present orders on hand for XY as being 
total orders  export orders 
relatively large  
adequate (usual seasonal stock)  
or not customary 
too small 
We do not export XY. 
 
(7)  Allowing for changes in sales conditions, our domestic sales prices (net) for XY compared to 





Expectations for the next 3 months 
 
(8)  Our domestic production activity
 regarding XY will presumably increase  
remain largely unchanged 
decrease. 
No significant domestic production. 
 
(9)  Allowing for changes in sales conditions, our domestic sales prices (net) for XY will 
presumably 
rise 
remain largely unchanged 
fall. 
 
(10)  Taking into account export contracts already concluded and negotiations in progress, the volume 
of our export business regarding XY will presumably 
increase 
remain largely unchanged 
decrease. 
We do not export XY. 
 
(11)  Persons employed* (domestic enterprises only) 
The number of employees producing XY will 
increase 
remain largely unchanged 
decrease. 
 
Expectations for the next 6 months 
(12)  As regards the business cycle*, business conditions for XY will  
tend to improve  
remain largely unchanged 
tend to worsen. 
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Special questions   (January, April, July, October) 
 
(A) At  present, our orders on hand for XY correspond to a production period of 
  
up to about ... month(s)  No orders 
on hand  ½  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
If more than 10 months, 
please indicate number 
                  
 
 
(B) Capacity  utilisation  in respect of the production of XY (standard full utilisation = 100 %) at 
present amounts to up to ... % 
 
30  40   50   60   70   75   80   85   90   95   100   more than 100 %, namely: 
 
 
(C)  In the light of our present orders on hand and the new orders expected for the next 12 months, we 
consider our present technical capacity for XY as being 
 




(D1) Our  domestic  production activity is at present being hampered  
 
  Yes    No 
 
(D2) If  yes, by which factors: 
 
  Not enough orders 
Lack of skilled labour 
  Lack of raw materials and/or primary products 
  Insufficient technical capacity 
  Financing squeeze  
 Other  factors 
 
(E)  Competitive conditions of our firm for XY in the last 3 months –  
compared with the previous 3 months – have developed as follows 
 
Domestic market   Foreign markets 
    within    outside    the European Union 
Improved 
    Remained unchanged  
 Worsened 
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Special questions  (February, May, August, November) 
 
(A)  Stocks of raw materials and primary products 
Our stocks of raw materials and primary products essential for the production of XY will at present last for a 
 
production of ... weeks**  No stocks  Less than 
1/2  ½  1 2 3 4 5 6 more  than 
6 weeks, 
namely 
          
 
** In terms of the present production volume. 
 
(B)  Stocks of finished products  
Our stocks of unsold finished products of XY at present correspond to a 
 
production of ... weeks**  No stocks  Less than 
½  ½  1 2 3 4 5 6 More  than 
6 weeks, 
namely 
          
 
** In terms of the present production volume. 
 
(C)  Innovations
11          
   
 
(1)  We assume that the market for XY in the medium run (about 5 years), ie excluding purely 
cyclical fluctuations, will 
 
   Germany  Abroad  Total 
grow  significantly     (1) 
grow  slightly      (2) 
remain  unchanged     (3) 
contract  slightly      (4) 
contract  significantly     (5) 
            
 
(2)  Innovations regarding the production of XY in 2001 in our firm were 
      
   Product  Production 
completed      
discontinued      
planning completed       
still  in  planning      
not  planned.      
 
(3)  In terms of their total turnover, the following phases applied in 2001 to our products of the 
product range XY (estimates will do):  
 
Phase of market introducution  (Innovation)      ..... %  
Growth  phase      .....  %   
Stagnation phase        ..... %  
Contraction phase        ..... %  
                                                 
11 Innovations mean new developments and major improvements in the product and/or production.  
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Special questions  (March, June, September, December) 
 
 
(A1)  We are currently working overtime 
 
Yes   No 
 
(A2)  If yes, more than is customary 
 
   Yes    No 
 
(B1)  We are currently working short time  
 
   Yes    No 
 
(B2)  We will presumably work short time within the next 3 months 
 
   Yes    No 
 
(A)  In the light of foreseeable sales trends for XY, we consider that our present staff numbers for the next 12 
months will be  
 
-  too large   (e. g. reduction in staff numbers necessary) 
-  appropriate  
-  too small  (e. g. additional persons must be employed) 
 
(B)  In 2001 our enterprise generated its turnover at the following production sites: 
(estimates will do) 
 
          In % of total turnover 
Own  production      
-  in  Germany     % 
-  abroad     % 
 
Contract production 
-  in  Germany     % 
-  abroad     % 
 
Additional purchases of merchandise  
-  in  Germany     % 
-  abroad     % 
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